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RESALES OF OFFSHORE SECURITIES INTO THE 
UNITED STATES: EVALUATING THE 
OVERVALUATION RISK TO U.S. INVESTORS 
STEPHEN J. CHOI* 
ABSTRACT 
Examining a sample of 701 offshore securities offerings under Regulation 
S of the Securities Act from 1993 to 1997, this Article tests whether foreign 
investors expect to resell Regulation S securities in the United States ahead 
of the U.S. secondary market reaction to news of the offering. The Article 
provides evidence from an event study that the secondary market reaction to 
a Regulation S offering is on average negative and statistically significant. 
Foreign investors able to resell into the United States before the secondary 
market reaction may act as conduits for issuers attempting to sell overvalued 
securities into the United States to the detriment of domestic investors. To the 
extent managers seek to benefit pre-offering shareholders, they will negotiate 
to give foreign investors as small an offering discount as possible. In 
contrast, where foreign investors are unable to resell prior to the secondary 
market negative reaction to news of the offering, foreign investors will 
demand a greater discount in compensation for the entire expected market 
reaction. Without such a discount, Regulation S offerings result in a transfer 
in value from foreign investors to U.S. investors; rational foreign investors 
will choose not to participate in such offerings. Controlling for other factors 
that may affect the offering discount, this Article furnishes evidence on the 
offering discount consistent with the hypothesis that foreign investors were in 
fact unable to engage in resales ahead of the U.S. secondary market reaction 
to a Regulation S offering. 
 
 
 * Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall). Special thanks to Un 
Kyung Park. Thanks for helpful comments to Jae-Sun Chung, Jesse Fried, Andrew Guzman, John Yoo 
and the participants at the F. Hodge O’Neal Corporate and Securities Law Symposium (2000). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p519 Choi.doc  4/20/01   5:35 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
520 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 78:519 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Regulation S of the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”) 
represents a policy choice to respect territorial boundaries:1 where a 
securities transaction affects parties within the United States, the U.S. 
securities regime should apply; where a transaction occurs wholly outside the 
United States, the securities regulatory regime of other countries should 
apply. Regulation S provides an exemption from the registration 
requirements of Section 5 of the Securities Act for those offerings occurring 
“outside the United States,”2 thus allowing a limited means for U.S. issuers 
selling abroad to avoid certain requirements of the U.S. securities regime.3 
Proponents of Regulation S argue that the territorial approach promotes 
respect for the sovereignty of foreign jurisdictions and alleviates the risk of 
conflict with the requirements of foreign securities regulatory regimes.4 
With this policy choice, however, emerges a dilemma: how should 
 
 
 1. See Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 33-6779, 1988 WL 239804, *9 
(S.E.C.) [hereinafter, the 1988 Proposing Release] (“The Regulation proposed today is based on a 
territorial approach to section 5 of the Securities Act. Under such an approach, the registration of 
securities is intended to protect the U.S. capital markets and all investors purchasing in the U.S. 
market, whether U.S. or foreign nationals.”). Regulation S is contained in Rules 901 through 905 of 
the Securities Act. See Securities Act Rules 901-905, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-.905 (1999). The SEC 
adopted Regulation S in 1990. See Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 33-6863, 
[1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 84,524 (Apr. 24, 1990) [hereinafter “Adopting 
Release”]. See also Guy P. Lander, Regulation S—Securities Offerings Outside the United States, 21 
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 339 (1996) (providing a summary of the original Regulation S). 
 2. Securities Act Rule 901, 17 C.F.R. § 230.901 (1999). 
 3. Section 5 of the Securities Act governs the registration process for securities offered or sold 
through any means of interstate commerce. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1994). Interstate commerce, in turn, 
is defined broadly to include transactions between the United States and a foreign country. See 15 
U.S.C. § 77b(a)(7) (1994). For a description of the operation of Section 5 see LOUIS LOSS & JOEL 
SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 72–77 (1995). Even after complying with 
the exemption requirements under Regulation S, U.S. companies issuing securities abroad are still 
subject to U.S. antifraud liability and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934’s (the “Exchange Act”) 
periodic disclosure requirements. See Preliminary Notes 1 & 3 to Regulation S.  
 4. See 1988 Proposing Release, supra note 1, at *9 (“Principles of comity and reasonable 
expectations of participants in the global markets justify reliance on laws applicable in jurisdictions 
outside the United States to define disclosure requirements for transactions effected offshore.”). 
 A debate presently exists in the securities regulation literature on the merits of regulatory choice. 
Several commentators have argued that issuers should have some amount of choice in the securities 
regulatory regime governing transactions in the issuers’ securities regardless of the physical location of 
the issuer. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the 
International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903 (1998); Roberta Romano, 
Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998). But 
see Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate Whom , 95 
MICH . L. REV. 2498 (1997) (arguing against regulatory choice and advocating instead that the home 
country of an issuer should regulate the disclosure regime for the issuer regardless of where investors 
are located or transactions take place).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss2/8
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regulators treat offshore offerings that result in resales of unregistered 
securities into the United States?5 The U.S. securities regime is transaction-
focused. Once foreign investors possess investment intent and the offering 
has “come to rest abroad,” the investors are not treated as participating in the 
issuer’s distribution of the Regulation S securities.6 Foreign investors may 
then freely resell into the United States.7 Through resales, securities intended 
for foreign markets may make their way into the United States, thus 
providing issuers a means of avoiding the Securities Act’s registration 
requirements while indirectly placing their securities in U.S. markets. In the 
extreme case, foreign purchasers may engage in short sales of Regulation S 
securities into the United States immediately after making their purchase, 
thereby eliminating any investment risk to themselves and locking in 
whatever discount they receive from the issuer.8 
The SEC responded to this policy dilemma in 1998 by imposing 
additional limitations on Regulation S transactions (the “1998 Reforms”).9 
 
 
 5. In 1996, SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, Jr. stated that Regulation S was “one safe harbor with 
too many pirates in it.” Brett D. Fromson, SEC Tightens Overseas Sales Rules, WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 
1996, at F3. 
 6. See Registration of Foreign Offerings by Domestic Issuers; Registration of Underwriters of 
Foreign Offerings as Broker-Dealer, Securities Act Release No. 33-4708, 29 Fed. Reg. 9828 (1964) 
(“[T]he Commission has not taken any action for failure to register securities of United States 
corporations distributed abroad to foreign nationals, even though use of jurisdictional means may be 
involved in the offering. It is assumed in these situations that the distribution is to be effected in a 
manner which will result in the securities coming to rest abroad.”). 
 7. See 1988 Proposing Release, supra note 1, at *10 (“After the foreign distribution has been 
completed and the marketing efforts have terminated, routine secondary trading may begin as a matter 
of course. The periodic reporting requirements of the Exchange Act would protect investors in the U.S. 
market by assuring that information concerning the issuer would be available.”). See also Sara Hanks, 
Direct Regulation S Offerings and the SEC’s “Problematic Practices” Release, 2 STAN. J. L. BUS. & 
FIN. 303, 321 (1996) (“The restricted period [of the Original Regulation S] raises a presumption 
against availability of Section [4(1)] during its running, which presumption is reversed on the fortieth 
day.”). Foreign investors, for example, may use Section 4(1)’s exemption for transactions “not 
involving an issuer, underwriter, or dealer.” 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1994).  
 8. In a well-publicized case, the SEC issued a cease-and-desist order against GFL Ultra Ltd., a 
British Virgin Islands investment company. See In re GFL Ultra Fund Ltd., Securities Act Release No. 
7423, [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,949 at 89,752 (June 18, 1997). GFL Ultra 
engaged in several purchases of securities sold overseas through Regulation S typically at a discount of 
15 to 20 percent of the U.S. secondary market price. Rather than wait until the expiration of the 40-day 
restricted period under Regulation S, GFL Ultra immediately engaged in short sales of securities of the 
issuer inside the United States. At the end of the 40-day restricted period, GFL Ultra then used its 
Regulation S securities to cover its short position. GFL Ultra, therefore, was able to guarantee a profit 
from its large discount in the U.S. secondary market price without any risk to itself through its short-
sale technique. See id. at 89,753 & n.5 (reporting that the total profit to GFL Ultra was greater than 
$840,000).  
 9. See Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 33-7505, 1998 WL 63607 
[February 17, 1998] [hereinafter the “1998 Amending Release”]. The amendments embodied in 
Securities Act Release No. 33-7505 became effective on April 27, 1998. In response to the risk of 
short sales and other hedging transactions, the SEC in its 1998 Reforms promulgated Rule 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Under the 1998 Reforms, all domestic issuers and distributors taking part in a 
Regulation S equity offering must comply with certification,10 legending,11 
and stop-transfer12 restrictions during the one-year “distribution compliance 
period” following a Regulation S offering.13 Once issued, Regulation S 
securities are also considered “restricted”;14 foreign investors may not resell 
such securities into the United States without meeting the registration 
requirements under Section 5 of the Securities Act or one of its exemptions. 
For example, foreign investors may avail themselves of Rule 144’s resale 
exemption if they fulfill its requirements, including meeting a one-year 
holding period before commencing resales into the United States.15 
The benefit of the SEC’s 1998 Reforms to Regulation S turns on the 
actual harm done to U.S. investors from the resale of unregistered securities 
into the United States.16 This Article focuses on one particular harm: the 
 
 
902(g)(1)(ii), requiring distributors of a Regulation S offering to agree in writing that they will not 
“engage in hedging transactions with regard to such securities prior to the expiration of the distribution 
compliance period specified in Category 2 or 3 . . . unless in compliance with the [Securities] Act.” 
Securities Act Rule 902(g)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(g)(1)(ii) (1999). In addition, Rule 903 was 
amended to require purchasers of a Category 3 Regulation S offering (including all domestic issuers of 
equity securities) to agree “not to engage in hedging transactions with regard to such securities unless 
in compliance with the [Securities] Act.” Securities Act Rule 903(b)(3), 17 C.F.R. 
§ 230.903(B)(3)(iii)(B)(2) (1999).  
 10. Rule 903(b)(3) includes a requirement that purchasers certify that they are not a U.S. person 
and agree to resell the securities only in accordance with Regulation S, in compliance with Section 5’s 
registration requirements, or through another exemption from registration. See Securities Act Rule 
903(b)(3), 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(b)(3)(iii)(B)(1)-(2) (1999). 
 11. Issuers are required to place a legend on issued securities indicating that the securities were 
sold through Regulation S and are unregistered. See Securities Act Rule 903(b)(3), 17 C.F.R. 
§ 230.903(b)(3)(iii)(3) (1999). 
 12. Issuers are required to refuse to register any transfer of the securities not made through a 
registered offering, an exemption from registration, or under the terms of Regulation S. See Securities 
Act Rule 903(b)(3), 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(g)3(b)(3)(iii)(4) (1999). 
 13. U.S. issuers of equity through a Regulation S offering face a distribution compliance period 
of 1 year. See Securities Act Rule 903(b)(3), 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(b)(3)(iii) (1999). Prior to the 
expiration of the distribution compliance period, issuers and distributors must ensure that no offers or 
sales are made “to a U.S. person or for the account or benefit of a U.S. person (other than a 
distributor).” See Securities Act Rule 903(b)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(b)(2)(ii) (1999). Issuers and 
distributors must also implement “offering restrictions” prior to the expiration of the distribution 
compliance period. See Securities Act Rule 902(g), 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(g) (1999). 
 14. See Securities Act Rule 905, 17 C.F.R. § 230.905 (1999). 
 15. See Securities Act Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1999). Rule 144 provides a safe harbor 
from the definition of an “underwriter” under the Securities Act for those who attempt to resell 
restricted securities. To the extent the conditions of Rule 144 are met, an investor may then use the 
transaction exemption under Section 4(1) of the Securities Act to avoid the registration requirement 
under Section 5 of the Securities Act. See id.  
 16. See Problematic Practices Under Regulation S, Securities Act Release No. 33-7190, 1995 
WL 385849 (S.E.C.) (June 27, 1995) [hereinafter, 1995 Problematic Practices Release]. Others have 
also questioned whether U.S. investors are harmed through resales of Regulation S securities into the 
United States. See Sara Hanks & Richard Cohn, The Wrong Weapon and the Wrong Target: The 
SEC’s Recent Proposed Changes to Regulation S, INSIGHTS, Aug. 1997, at 23, 26 “[the SEC] has 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss2/8
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resale of overvalued securities. For example, U.S. issuers may use foreign 
investors as conduits to sell unregistered securities quickly to unsuspecting 
purchasers in the United States when the market overvalues the securities to 
the benefit of both foreign investors and the issuer.17 Once the market learns 
of the overvaluation and the market price falls, U.S. purchasers experience 
negative returns. 
Crucial to the ability of issuers and foreign investors to gain at the 
expense of U.S. investors from the resale of overvalued securities is the U.S. 
secondary market reaction to information regarding the offering prior to the 
commencement of resales. Where the U.S. secondary market receives news 
of the offshore offering prior to resales, the market price may react negatively 
to such news. The market, for example, may take information on a 
Regulation S offering as a signal that managers believe the market price is 
overvalued.18 To the extent that market is correct in its reaction and 
eliminates the overvaluation, foreign investors receive no gain from the 
resale of securities into the U.S. securities market. Foreign investors will then 
demand a greater offering discount from the issuer in compensation for the 
expected reduced resale price the foreign investors will receive upon resales 
into the United States.19 
This Article examines how the market reacts to information of a 
Regulation S offering and whether issuers are able to utilize Regulation S to 
engage indirectly in the sale of overvalued securities to U.S. investors before 
the U.S. market learns of the offering. This Article provides evidence that, 
even under the original Regulation S, foreign investors were unable to resell 
before the U.S. markets learned of the offering. Therefore, although 
Regulation S offerings are sold at a discount, much of that discount 
 
 
never stated that investors are somehow harmed by the secondary trading of the securities into the 
United States after the securities have come to rest  abroad. Indeed, the Commission has not even 
asserted that offerings complying with the provisions of the safe harbor have resulted in a large 
volume of flow back.”); Hanks, supra  note 7, at 325 (1996) (noting that “the first public grumblings 
about Regulation S came from shareholders who discovered that companies in which they had 
invested had made Regulation S offerings at substantial discounts from the market price, resulting in 
the dilution of their holdings and often in reduced value of the securities”). 
 17. I address the range of harms that Regulation S may pose to investors more fully in Stephen J. 
Choi, The Unfounded Fear of Regulation S: Empirical Evidence on Offshore Securities Offerings 
(forthcoming Duke Law Journal, 2000). For example, managers may use a Regulation S offering to 
engage in self-dealing, selling securities at a large discount to entities in which the managers own an 
equity interest. 
 18. See infra text accompany notes 24-29 (discussing the signaling effect from a Regulation S 
offering). 
 19. The offering discount is defined throughout the article in relation to the U.S. secondary 
market price for the issuer’s common stock at the start of the Regulation S offering. The offering 
discount may be expressed as: Offering Discount = U.S. Secondary Market Price at Start of Offering*-
*Offering Price. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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represents compensation for the expected secondary market reaction to news 
of the offering. 
Part I provides a theoretical discussion of the relationship of information-
related effects in the U.S. secondary market to the Regulation S offering 
discount. It also analyzes possible harms to U.S. investors. Part II discusses 
empirical tests of the information effect through an analysis of 701 
Regulation S offshore offerings. Part III concludes that the empirical 
evidence supports the hypothesis that foreign investors are unable to resell 
into U.S. secondary markets ahead of negative reaction to the Regulation S 
offering. 
I. THE INFORMATION EFFECT FROM REGULATION S OFFERINGS 
Regulation S offerings are typically sold at a large discount from the U.S. 
secondary market price at the time of the offering.20 This discount results 
from a combination of factors. For example , foreign investors may demand 
compensation for the illiquidity risk they bear while resale of the securities 
into the United States is prohibited.21 Similarly, foreign investors, at an 
informational disadvantage relative to the issuer’s management, may require 
payment for the risk that the foreign investors may misprice the offered 
securities because of their lack of adequate information. Managerial 
opportunism may also drive the discount. Insiders, for instance, may utilize a 
Regulation S offering to engage in self-dealing, selling securities at a large 
discount to entities in which the insiders own an interest. Insiders may also 
raise capital through a Regulation S offering with the intention of exploiting 
 
 
 20. See BNA SEC. L. Daily, May 25, 1999 at D7 (quoting a release from the U.S. Attorney for 
the Eastern District of New York dated May 21, 1999, stating that “‘Stock issued under Regulation S 
typically is priced at substantial discounts below the prevailing market price of the issuing company’s 
stock*. . ..’”). Indeed, it is unclear what harm U.S. investors would suffer if a Regulation S offering is 
sold at a large premium relative to the fundamental value of the issued securities. Absent insider self-
dealing or the presence of confidential information, foreign investors systematically lose relative to 
mostly U.S.-based pre-offering shareholders in the issuer if the foreign investors purchase at a 
premium. See infra  note 32 and accompanying text.  
 Nevertheless, the SEC has argued, in the context of convertible debt securities sold through 
Regulation S, that even securities sold with a high conversion premium relative to the U.S. secondary 
market price bring the possibility of abuse. See Adopting Release, supra  note 1, at *5 (“The potential 
for abuse exists whenever a domestic issuer can create offshore, in a transaction not subject to the 
registration provisions of the U.S. securities laws, pools of equity securities that appear to be 
immediately tradeable back into the United States because of their unrestricted status.”). The SEC, 
however, did not elaborate on the precise nature or magnitude of this potential “abuse.” 
 21. See 1998 Amending Release, supra  note 9, at *16 (“The size of that price discount reflects, at 
least in part, the compensation buyers of shares receive for giving up the ability to readily sell the 
shares immediately in the public market.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss2/8
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the capital for their own private purposes at the expense of shareholders.22 
Foreign investors then will demand a larger discount to compensate for the 
decrease in company value due to the suboptimal use of capital.23 This 
section focuses specifically on the theoretical relationship between the 
offering discount and the expected secondary market reaction to news of a 
Regulation S offering. 
News of a Regulation S offering provides valuable information to the 
securities markets. All other things being equal, managers seeking to 
maximize value to pre-offering shareholders will tend to promote offerings 
where they have reason to believe that the market overvalues the issuer’s 
securities.24 Conversely, managers will delay offerings where the market 
undervalues the securities.25 For example, consider the following 
hypothetical situation involving Zorox, Inc., a company based in Missouri. 
Zorox has a U.S. secondary market price of $100 per share and one million 
outstanding common shares traded on NASDAQ. The company’s managers, 
however, have non-public information that the per share fundamental value 
of Zorox is $70, giving a $30 difference between the secondary market price 
and the fundamental value (the “overvaluation surplus”).26 To the extent 
 
 
 22. For example, managers may use the proceeds from a sale to engage in  an acquisition to 
increase the quantity of the assets under their control regardless of the value to shareholders of the 
acquisition. Cf. Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV. 597, 599 
(1989) (discussing the hypothesis that bidders in a takeover contest pay too much for the target 
company). Black writes: “These overpayments don’t cause bidder stock prices to drop because 
investors already expect the bidder to waste the money, one way or another.” Id. 
 23. For example, suppose that a company has 1,000 shares outstanding with a secondary market 
price of $100 per share and a total aggregate fundamental value of $100,000. The company then 
attempts to raise an additional $100,000 capital through an offering, issuing 1,000 shares. To the extent 
the purchasing investors believe that the managers will simply squander the offering proceeds resulting 
in no net gain to the company, they will refuse to pay $100 per share for the offering. Instead, 
purchasing investors will pay at most $50 per share (the per share value post -offering where the 
company has 2,000 outstanding shares and is worth $100,000). The prospect of suboptimal use of 
capital raised in the offering, therefore, results in a 50% discount from the secondary market price 
prior to the offering.  
 24. See Stewart Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions 
When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have, 132 J. FIN. ECON. 187 (1984) (describing 
the incentive of managers to sell securities where the secondary market price overvalues the company 
relative to its fundamental value). See also Paul Asquith & David W. Mullins, Jr., Equity Issues and 
Offering Dilution, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 61 (1986); Ronald W. Masulis & Ashok N. Korwar, Seasoned 
Equity Offerings: An Empirical Investigation, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 91 (1986); Wayne H. Mikkelson & M. 
Megan Partch, Valuation Effects of Security Offerings and the Issuance Process, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 31 
(1986). 
 25. See Robert A. Korajczyk et al., The Effect of Information Releases on the Pricing and Timing 
of Equity Issues, 4 Rev. Fin. Stud. 685, 688-92 (1992) (discussing the incentive of managers to delay 
an equity offering prior to the disclosure of positive information but not prior to the disclosure of 
negative information). 
 26. For purposes of this article, the fundamental value is defined as the amount investors would 
pay for the issuer’s securities if they had the same knowledge as management on the valuation of the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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managers successfully issue an additional one million shares of Zorox to the 
market at $100 per share, they will increase the fundamental value of Zorox 
to $85 per share, benefiting all pre-offering shareholders.27 Rational investors 
in the market will recognize this incentive on the part of managers. The fact 
that a company’s managers seek to raise capital from the market may suggest 
that the managers believe the market presently overvalues the company. 
The market may therefore take news of a Regulation S offering as a 
signal that managers believe the U.S. secondary market price overvalues the 
securities. Certainly, several other motivations may exist for a Regulation S 
offering. Companies seeking to enter a new geographical market, for 
example, may desire to establish shareholder ties with key individuals in 
those countries.28 The possibility of different motivations, therefore, may 
result in a noisy signal sent to the market. Nevertheless, to the extent the 
market suffers from no systematic biases in how it interprets information, on 
average the market will correctly determine the degree of overvaluation.29 
For purposes of discussing the relationship between the offering discount 
and the secondary market effect from a Regulation S offering, consider the 
two extreme situations, when the market learns of the Regulation S offering: 
(a) prior to when resales commence and (b) after foreign investors have 
successfully resold all of their securities into the United States at the pre-
disclosure secondary market price.30 
First, in situation (a) the market learns of a Regulation S offering before 
foreign investors begin reselling these securities into the United States. For 
example, an issuer may voluntarily make a public announcement of the 
offering before the end of the Regulation S restricted period. Alternatively, 
the market may learn of the Regulation S offering from the increase in 
trading volume as resales take place in the United States.31 To the extent 
 
 
company. 
 27. This assumes that managers do not simply waste the offering proceeds. To simplify, the 
article assumes, unless otherwise specified, that managers place the offering proceeds into an interest-
bearing bank account, preserving the value for shareholders.  
 28. For instance, Nord Pacific Ltd. sold 600,000 shares of its common stock to Mineral 
Resources Development Co. Pty, Ltd., a corporation wholly owned by the Papua New Guinea 
government, in late 1997. Nord Pacific planned to use the proceeds of its offering to commence nickel 
and gold mining projects in Papua New Guinea. See Form 8-K filing for Nord Pacific Ltd., December 
24, 1997 (available at <http://www.sec.gov/edgarhp.htm>).  
 29. The noise in the information signal sent from news of a Regulation S offering increases the 
variance in the market’s overall reaction. 
 30. The market may also learn about the Regulation S offering during the period in which 
foreigners are conducting resales into the United States. Foreign investors that expect such a situation 
will anticipate a secondary market reaction somewhere between the two extremes, as described in the 
text. 
 31. An increase in trading volume may be due to several alternate possible factors. Nevertheless, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss2/8
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foreign investors are rational, they will take into account the expected 
secondary market price drop in computing the discount for which they 
negotiate. 
For example, consider Yoshi, an investor located in Japan. Yoshi is 
contemplating the purchase of securities from Zorox, Inc. Assume further 
that Zorox has one million shares of common stock outstanding, which trade 
on NASDAQ at $100 per share. However, Yoshi’s best estimate is that 
Zorox’s secondary market price will drop to $70 per share once information 
about the offering is made public. Yoshi does not expect to be able to resell 
into the United States until after information on the Regulation S offering is 
made public. Where Yoshi negotiates to pay $100 per share, matching the 
present secondary market price, he will likely suffer losses on his investment 
once information on the offering is made public.32 On the other hand, where 
Yoshi negotiates to pay only $70 per share, receiving shares at a 30% 
discount from the present secondary market price, he will on average break 
even once resales commence into the United States.33 Yoshi’s large 
Regulation S discount, therefore, does not benefit Yoshi at the expense of 
U.S. investors; rather, it simply reflects the anticipated U.S. secondary 
market price once resales are allowed to commence.34 
 
 
a large rise in trading volume may focus analyst attention on the security, leading to further 
investigation, which may pinpoint the cause. 
 32. Not only will Yoshi lose systematically, but pre-offering investors in Zorox will benefit. For 
example, assume that one million shares of Zorox are outstanding and that each share has a 
fundamental value of $70 per share despite the market price of $100. If Yoshi were to purchase an 
additional one million shares at $100 per share, Zorox will take in $100 million in cash, raising its 
fundamental value to $85 per share. All pre-offering investors in Zorox therefore will benefit at 
Yoshi’s expense. 
 33. Of course, the market is not always accurate. Absent some systematic bias in the market, 
however, the market should on average be correct in its assessment of the overvaluation surplus. 
Rather than change the market’s average reaction, inaccuracies will result in a greater variance in the 
market’s reaction. Under certain circumstances, the variance of the market’s reaction may provide 
foreign investors with non-public information on the value of the company with the ability to gain at 
the expense of U.S. investors from resales. For example, after the market reaction to news of a 
Regulation S offering, foreign investors may choose to engage in resales only when the market 
mistakenly continues to overvalue the securities; when the market undervalues the securities, foreign 
investors may simply choose to hold onto their securities until the market eventually corrects its 
valuation.  
 Foreign investors, nevertheless, may face pressure to sell their securities as quickly as possible, 
regardless of whether the market under or overvalues the securities. In particular, foreign investors 
acting as conduits for the issuer may have a great deal of capital tied up in the Regulation S securities 
and thus face a large liquidity risk in addition to high capital costs. Such investors may resell into the 
United States even when the market undervalues the securities. The expected market reaction for such 
investors will therefore exactly equal the overvaluation surplus.  
 34. In contrast, the SEC has noted that one common “abuse” that occurred prior to the 1998 
reforms under Regulation S involved  
placements of securities purportedly offshore under Regulation S under circumstances that 
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Of course, Yoshi may have negotiated to pay only $60 a share, below the 
fundamental value of Zorox. In this situation, he will still enjoy a discount 
even after the secondary market adjusts for news of the Regulation S 
offering. Where Yoshi, for example, purchases one million shares at $60 per 
share, the fundamental value of Zorox will drop to $65 per share.35 Yoshi 
gains $5 per share. Importantly, the pre-offering Zorox shareholders bear the 
loss from the offering discount below the fundamental value given to Yoshi. 
To the extent managers own shares in Zorox or are compensated through 
reference to the share price, managers also are harmed and will agree to an 
offering price less than the fundamental value of the company in two 
possible cases. First, managers that engage in self-dealing, selling securities 
to entities in which they own an equity interest, will readily discount 
Regulation S securities past the issuer’s pre-offering fundamental value. 
Second, managers may choose to give unrelated foreign investors a discount 
to compensate the foreign investors for other risks associated with the 
offering, including the risk of illiquidity while the securities are prohibited 
from resale into the United States. Such compensation, in turn, may increase 
the value of the issuer to the extent the discount granted foreign investors is 
still lower in cost than alternate means of raising capital.36 
In situation (b), the market learns of the Regulation S offering only after 
the initiation of resales into the United States, and prices fail to react to this 
information before foreign investors successfully complete their resales into 
 
 
indicate that such securities are in essence being placed offshore temporarily to evade registration 
requirements with the result that the incidence of ownership of the securities never leaves the U.S. 
market, or that a substantial portion of the economic risk . . . is left in or is returned to the U.S. 
market. 
1995 Problematic Practices Release, supra  note 16, at *3.  
 When U.S. investors are fully aware of the Regulation S offering before foreign investors are able 
to shift the risk of the offering back into the United States, however, foreign investors and issuers are 
unable to gain even against unsuspecting U.S. investors. To the extent the market price accurately 
adjusts downward to take into account the news of the Regulation S offering, foreign investors 
engaging in resales will receive the post -disclosure fundamental value of the securities.  
 35. Yoshi’s purchase will result in offering proceeds of $60 million to Zorox. Assuming Zorox 
simply puts the money in a bank account, the fundamental value of Zorox will increase to $130 million 
(given a pre-offering fundamental value of $70 million). With 2 million shares outstanding post -
offering, the per share value will be $65 per share. 
 36. See Hanks, supra  note 7, at 313-14. 
It is no wonder that U.S. issuers favor a direct Regulation S transaction of this sort. Transaction 
costs are approximately ten percent of those involved in a public offering, and the transaction can 
be completed in days. This timing advantage is especially helpful where a company needs money 
fast to complete an acquisition, complete a build-out, or simply stay solvent. 
Id. But see Jon B. Jordan, Regulation S and Offshore Capital: Will the New Amendments Rid the Safe 
Harbor of Pirates? , 19 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 58, 86 (1998) (“[M]any American investors have 
perceived these discounts as providing an unfair market advantage to foreign investors.”).  
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the United States. Companies whose securities do not trade in an efficient 
market,37 for example, may face the possibility of a slow market reaction to 
the commencement of resales into the market from foreign investors. Foreign 
investors that negotiate for a discount based on the negative market reaction 
to news of the Regulation S offering, therefore, will benefit relative to U.S. 
investors. 
Consider Zorox, Inc. again. Assume that the present secondary market 
price is $100 per share. Zorox managers, however, possess non-public 
information that the fundamental value is only $70 per share. To take 
advantage of the market’s overvaluation, managers choose to make a 
Regulation S offering to Gabrielle, a foreign investor, at $95 per share. 
Gabrielle then resells quickly into the United States at $100 per share, just 
prior to Zorox’s disclosure of the Regulation S offering. Any U.S. investors 
purchasing from Gabrielle, therefore, overpay relative to the $70 
fundamental value of Zorox by $30 per share. Of the $30 overvaluation 
surplus, Gabrielle receives a benefit of $5 per share. The remaining $25 goes 
to the issuer as proceeds from the Regulation S offering to the foreign 
investors, benefiting all pre-offering shareholders. 
Note two important points about the theoretical possibility of managers 
using Regulation S to sell overvalued securities to U.S. investors. First, 
where securities are overvalued in the U.S. secondary market, managers must 
negotiate with foreign investors regarding the allocation of the return from 
this overvaluation. For example, in the Zorox hypothetical, managers could 
have sold Zorox stock to Gabrielle for $75 per share, giving Gabrielle a gain 
of $25 per share from reselling into the U.S. at $100 per share and the Zorox 
pre-offering shareholders a gain of $5 from the overvaluation. 
To the extent managers seek to maximize the welfare of pre-offering 
shareholders, however, managers will attempt to give foreign investors as 
small a discount as possible.38 Managers, of course, may seek to maximize 
 
 
 37. This Article uses the term “efficient market” to refer to a trading market that displays features 
of a semi-strong efficient market. The semi-strong version of the efficient capital markets hypothesis 
posits that the secondary market price of companies reflects all publicly available information on the 
company as well as all historical data in the company. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: 
A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970); see also Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient 
Capital Markets, the Crash, and the Fraud in the Market Theory, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 911 n.11 
(“The empirical evidence to date (with some exceptions) appears to establish the validity of the weak 
and semi-strong but not the strong form of the efficient capital markets hypothesis.”). Some have 
argued that markets are not efficient because of investor irrationalities and cognitive limitations in 
processing information. See Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: 
Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 853-54 (1992); Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock 
Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 
611, 648-50 (1995). 
 38. In the alternative, issuers may set up a phony offshore shell entity to act as a foreign investor 
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their own individual welfare. Where no self-dealing is involved, however, 
there is no incentive to give foreign investors an unnecessary premium. 
Therefore, in situations where it is likely that the U.S. secondary market will 
react slowly to information on Regulation S resales into the United States, 
managers will negotiate to give foreign investors something less than the 
entire information-related overvaluation surplus. The exact division of the 
overvaluation surplus will depend on the relative bargaining strengths of 
foreign intermediary investors and managers. Where many foreign investors 
compete to purchase Regulation S offerings, for example, managers will be 
able to capture more of the overvaluation surplus for the issuer and its pre-
offering shareholders. 
Second, the ability of foreign investors to resell securities in large 
quantities secretly into the United States faces a number of obstacles.39 For 
issuers followed by several analysts, the increase in trading volume will 
receive immediate attention. Analysts may then further investigate to 
determine the source of the increased volume. Foreign investors that hope to 
take advantage of a slowly reacting market, therefore, must sell securities 
piecemeal into the market. Where several foreign investors own securities, 
they will also face a collective action problem in restraining themselves from 
flooding the market with their securities. Similarly, financial institutions with 
multinational offices may learn of a Regulation S offering from resales that 
occur abroad and convey this information to related analysts monitoring the 
issuer inside the United States.40  
On the other hand, not all companies enjoy an active analyst following.41 
 
 
and then use the offshore entity to resell directly into the United States. See, e.g., Jordan, supra note 
36, at 76-78. In the case of an offshore shell, issuers will have no incentive to give the shell any 
discount related to the overvaluation surplus. Instead, issuers will keep the entire surplus for 
themselves.  
 39. Cf. Hanks, supra  note 7, at 328. 
In modern securities markets, decisions are made on a shorter term than forty days. Investments 
today are made on a fluid basis, and the holder of securities experiences far greater risk in a few 
days than would have been experienced over forty days several decades ago. In addition, 
distributions of securities come to rest in a much shorter period than in earlier decades.  
Id. 
 40. Many financial market intermediaries are now present in a large number of different 
countries. For example, the investment banking and securities firm Goldman Sachs has 41 offices in 
23 countries worldwide. See The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. homepage (visited April 9, 2000) 
<http://www.gs.com>. Information learned by Goldman Sachs brokers located abroad regarding U.S. 
securities issued or traded abroad, therefore, may make its way easily into the U.S. markets through 
the Goldman Sachs office in New York. 
 41. Evidence exists that fewer than one thousand of the more than ten thousand Exchange Act 
reporting companies have at least one investment analyst actively following the company. See JAMES 
D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 41 (Little, Brown 1991) (citing 
Report of the Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure to the Securities and Exchange 
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The absence of analysts may make it more difficult for the market to respond 
accurately to the increased trading volume from resales into the United 
States. Nevertheless, where few analysts follow a particular company, the 
market typically is thinly traded.42 A large influx of securities therefore may 
create a larger percentage increase in the trading volume, prompting even 
casual market participants to investigate further to discover the cause of the 
volume increase. 
II. EMPIRICAL TESTS OF THE INFORMATION EFFECT FROM REGULATION S 
OFFERINGS 
This Part provides an empirical test of whether foreign investors possess 
the ability to use Regulation S offerings to resell securities into U.S. markets 
prior to information disclosure of the offering, acting as a conduit for issuers 
to sell overvalued securities indirectly to U.S. investors. As discussed in Part 
I, the discount that foreign investors negotiate will depend on whether 
foreign investors expect (a) the market to learn of the Regulation S offering 
prior to when resales commence or (b) the market to learn of the offering 
only after resales are concluded. 
To the extent foreign investors expect the secondary market price to drop 
in response to information on the offering before resales may commence, 
they will refuse to pay any more than the expected post-disclosure secondary 
market price, resulting in a large discount. Where the market reaction is 
correct, foreign investors will demand a discount equal to the entire 
overvaluation surplus.43 All other things being equal, therefore, the 
Regulation S offering discount will be larger for offerings where foreign 
investors expect the market to adjust for the Regulation S offering prior to 
resales.44 
Figure 1 provides a graphic breakdown of the discounts that foreign 
investors will negotiate under situations (a) and (b). 
 
 
Commission xviii & 40-42 (1977)).  
 42. For example, companies that trade on the U.S. over-the-counter pink sheets market have few 
active analysts tracking their securities and a relatively low daily trading volume. See Harold S. 
Bloomenthal, Securities and Federal Corporate Law, 3E SEC. & FED. CORP . LAW § 23.10 (1999) 
(providing a description of the pink sheets market). 
 43. For a discussion of the effect of market inaccuracy in its reaction to news of a Regulation S 
offering see supra  note 33. 
 44. Of course, everything else may not be equal. For example, post -SEC reporting reform, fewer 
issuers may seek to use Regulation S with the goal of selling overvalued securities to U.S. investors. 
Nevertheless, the SEC’s reforms did not eliminate the presence of overvalued securities in the U.S. 
secondary markets. Nor did the reforms reduce the incentive of managers with undervalued securities 
to forego an offering. This Article’s empirical tests attempt to control for shifts in the pool of issuers 
seeking to engage in a Regulation S offering. See infra  Part III.C & D. 
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To test whether foreign investors are able to resell prior to information 
disclosure of the Regulation S offering in the U.S. market, this Article makes 
use of Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) reforms in 1996 that 
greatly increased the amount of information on a Regulation S offering 
available to the U.S. investing public prior to the commencement of resales 
into the United States. After November 18, 1996, the SEC required issuers to 
reveal all equity-related Regulation S offerings under Item 9 of Form 8-K 
within fifteen days of the offering (the “post-reporting reform” period).45 In 
such situations, the secondary market will react to the disclosure of the 
Regulation S discount prior to the commencement of resales after the forty-
day restricted period.46 If foreign investors were able to resell prior to 
information disclosure before the reporting reforms, one would expect that 
 
 
 45. See Item 9, Form 8-K, Exchange Act. See also  SEC, Periodic Reporting of Unregistered 
Equity Sales, Release No. 34-37801 (Oct. 10, 1996). Prior to December 31, 1998, Item 9 of Form 8-K 
required issuers of Regulation S equity securities to report the information mandated under Item 702 of 
Regulation S-B, including the offering date, the amount of securities, the total offering price, and the 
principal underwriters, in addition to other information. 
 After January 1, 1999, the SEC stopped requiring disclosure of Regulation S offerings within 15 
days after the offering. Instead, issuers could disclose the offering at the time of their next periodic 
Exchange Act disclosure filing. See 1998 Amending Release, supra  note 9, at *12. 
 46. On the other hand, where immediate short sales may occur of a Regulation S issuer’s 
securities into the United States both prior to and after the reporting reforms, one would expect no 
change in the offering discount, all other things being equal between the two time periods. For a 
discussion of this point see infra  text accompanying note 102. 
Figure 1:  Breakdown of the Reg S Offering Discount for Situations (a) and (b) 
Illiquidity and 
Other Risks 
Compensation 
for Market 
Reaction 
Illiquidity and 
Other Risks 
Negotiated Share of 
the Overvaluation 
Surplus 
Situation (a) Situation (b)  
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the offering discount increased after the reporting reforms, all other things 
being equal. 
Using this Article’s sample of Regulation S offerings, the Article tests the 
information effect of Regulation S offerings. Part A provides a description of 
the Regulation S data set. Part B reports the empirical tests. First, the article 
tests the hypothesis that the market reacts negatively to a Regulation S 
offering. Second, the Article examines the driving factors behind the 
markets’ assessment of a Regulation S offering. Finally, the Article tests 
whether, prior to the SEC’s 1996 reporting reforms, issuers use Regulation S 
to sell overvalued securities through foreign intermediaries to U.S.-based 
investors. 
A. Description of the Regulation S Data Set 
This Article’s data set of Regulation S offerings spans the period from 
January 1, 1993 to December 31, 1997. Individual offerings are identified 
through examination of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange 
Act”) reporting filing forms 10-K, 10-Q, and 8-K on LEXIS and Westlaw as 
well as the SEC’s own Internet version of the EDGAR databases.47 The PR-
Newswire and Wall Street Journal databases on Westlaw were also searched 
for press releases and news articles useful in identifying Regulation S 
offerings during the sample period. 
Compared with the entire pool of Regulation S offerings, the data set 
contains two major limitations. First, the procedure used to identify the 
Regulation S offerings focuses only on Exchange Act reporting companies.48 
 
 
 47. See Forms 10-K, 10-Q, 8-K, Exchange Act. The SEC’s online version of the EDGAR 
database is located on the Internet at <http://www.sec.gov/edgarhp.htm> (visited April 14, 2000). 
 48. The Exchange Act imposes periodic information reporting requirements for certain issuers, 
commonly known as “Exchange Act reporting companies.” Companies listed on a national securities 
exchange must register and comply with the SEC’s periodic information disclosure requirements. See 
Exchange Act§ 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1994); Exchange Act § 12(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78l(b) (1994); 
see also Exchange Act § 3(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(1) (1994) (defining “exchange” for the purposes 
of the Exchange Act). In addition, companies whose total assets exceed $10 million and have a class of 
equity security (other than an exempted security) held of record by more than 500 shareholders must 
register the securities under the Exchange Act and thereby come under the periodic reporting 
requirements of § 13(a). See Exchange Act § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1994); Exchange Act § 12(g), 15 
U.S.C. § 78l(g) (1994); see also Exchange Act Rule 12g-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (1999) (raising the 
asset requirement to $10 million). 
 These required periodic information filings include annual Form 10-K, quarterly Form 10-Q, and 
occasional Form 8-K. See Exchange Act § 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1994); Exchange Act 
Regulation 13A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-1-13b2-2 (1999) (providing rules on periodic disclosure 
requirements of Exchange Act registered companies); Exchange Act Forms 10-K, 10-Q, 8-K. 
Companies that recently filed a registration statement which has become effective under the Securities 
Act must also comply with the periodic reporting requirements. See Exchange Act § 15(d), 15 U.S.C. 
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As a result, the Article’s empirical findings may not apply to smaller, non-
Exchange Act reporting companies, including issuers that are not listed on a 
national securities exchange and that fail to meet the SEC’s minimum net 
asset and number of shareholders requirements for Exchange Act reporting 
status. 
Second, this Article may miss a disproportionately large number of 
Regulation S offerings during the period before the 1996 reporting reforms. 
Prior to the SEC’s reporting reforms, issuers disclosed information on the 
offering in one of their SEC filings or financial statements only to the extent 
the offerings were "material" to the understanding of some other required 
information disclosure item.49 For example, some issuers disclosed 
information on their Regulation S offerings in their required discussion on 
capital resources under Item 7 of the annual Form 10-K filing.50 Regulation S 
offerings prior to November 1996 therefore comprise only a subset of the 
entire universe of Regulation S offerings. This subset, moreover, may be 
biased toward offerings where the issuer believed that disclosure of the 
offering outweighed any negative effects from disclosure. Nevertheless, due 
to the materiality requirement for SEC filings, the search uncovered the 
majority of larger size offerings. 
The number of Regulation S offerings in the data sample is reported in 
Table 1 both for the entire sample and for the subset of the sample not related 
to a Rule 144A offering. Rule 144A offerings differ from stand-alone 
Regulation S offering in a number of important ways. Technically only a 
resale exemption, Rule 144A provides purchasers of a Regulation S offering 
the ability to resell purchased securities quickly to qualified institutional 
buyers (“QIBs”) comprised mostly of large financial institutions.51 The 
 
 
§ 78O(d) (1994). 
 49. See Securities Act rule 408, 17 C.F.R. § 230.408 (1999). 
 50. Exchange Act reporting companies must file Form 10-K with the SEC annually. Item 7 of 
Form 10-K requires the disclosure of information described in Item 303 of Regulation S-K. See Item 7, 
Form 10-K (Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operation); 
Securities Act Regulation S-K Item 303, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (1999). Issuers may also voluntarily 
disclose their Regulation S offerings under Item 5 of Form 8-K to the extent the offering was 
“important.” See Item 5, Form 8-K, Exchange Act. 
 51. Rule 144A(a)(1) of the Securities Act defines a Qualified Institutional Buyer as an 
institutional entity that “in the aggregate owns and invests on a discretionary basis at least $100 
million in securities of issuers that are not affiliated with the entity . . . .” Securities Act Rule 
144A(a)(1)(i), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(a)(1)(I) (1999). Dealers registered pursuant to Section 15 of the 
Exchange Act must meet only a $10 million requirement. See Securities Act Rule 144A(a)(1)(ii), 17 
C.F.R. § 230.144A(a)(1)(ii) (1999). For the securities of non-Exchange Act reporting issuers,  the 
purchaser has the right to demand certain specified information at its discretion. Securities Act Rule 
144A(d)(4), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(d)(4) (1999). Finally, Rule 144A prohibits securities sold under its 
provisions from consisting of the same class of any security of the issuer listed on a U.S. securities 
exchange or traded on an automated U.S. interdealer quotation system, such as NASDAQ (the “non-
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prospect of a liquid aftermarket may result in a reduced discount for Rule 
144A-related Regulation S offerings.52 Many of the Rule 144A offerings also 
involve simultaneous placements inside the United States and therefore offer 
more regulatory protection for investors than purely overseas Regulation S 
offerings. 
Table 1: Number of Regulation S Offerings Over Sample Time Period 
Year 
Number of 
Offerings 
 
Mean 
Offering Amount 
(millions) 
 
Median 
Offering Amount 
(millions) 
Market 
Capitalization 
(millions) 
1993 30 195.0 16.9 1147.8 
1994 88 15.2 2.3 204.8 
1995 120 18.4 2.6 480.2 
1996 249 28.4 2.2 218.1 
1997 214 43.3 2.0 400.0 
Total 701 36.6 2.3 356.1 
 
 
fungibility” requirement). Securities convertible into a security that does trade on NASDAQ or a 
national securities exchange are nevertheless considered in compliance with the non-fungibility 
requirement to the extent a premium on conversion of at least 10% is applied. See Securities Act Rule 
144A(d)(3)(i), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(d)(3)(I) (1999).  
 52. The PORTAL market provides QIBs a forum to execute and settle transactions in non-
registered securities pursuant to Rule 144A. For a particular issuer’s securities to trade in the PORTAL 
market, the National Association of Securities Dealers must first grant their approval. See HAL S. 
SCOTT AND PHILIP A. WELLONS,  INTERNATIONAL FINANCE :  TRANSACTIONS,  POLICY , AND 
REGULATION 83-84 (4th ed. 1997) (describing the PORTAL market). Due in part to the PORTAL 
market, the quantity of resales taking advantage of Rule 144A has grown dramatically. From eight 
placements totaling $916.0 million in 1990, the use of Rule 144A grew to 243 placements totaling 
$44.672 billion in 1993. See Staff Report on Rule 144A [1994-1995 Decisions] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 85,428 (Aug. 18, 1994). 
 In addition, Rule 144A offerings may result in an offering premium to satisfy the non-fungibility 
requirement for a Rule 144A resale. See supra  note 51 (describing the non-fungibility requirement of 
Rule 144A). See also  Alan L. Beller, Memorandum from Cravath, Swaine & Moore Regarding Sales 
of Convertible Securities of U.S. Reporting Companies Under Regulation S (August 24, 1998) RE: 
Sales of Convertible Securities of U.S. Reporting Companies Under Regulation S, 1085 PLI/Corp. 
177, 179 (1998) (noting that the average conversion premium for Rule 144A offerings that include a 
tranche of securities issued under Regulation S was “well above the 10% threshold required under 
Rule 144A”). 
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Number of Non-Rule 144A Regulation S Offerings 
Year 
Number of 
Offerings 
 
Mean 
Offering Amount 
(millions) 
 
Median 
Offering Amount 
(millions) 
Market 
Capitalization 
(millions) 
1993 21 104.9 7.0 174.1 
1994 82 7.3 2.0 65.6 
1995 109 6.1 2.2 326.4 
1996 216 5.5 1.5 70.5 
1997 174 7.7 1.5 101.4 
Total 602 9.3 1.8 128.7 
Offerings of five different types of securities that are treated as equity 
under Regulation S are tracked:53 (1) common stock, (2) non-convertible 
preferred stock, (3) convertible preferred stock, (4) convertible debt 
securities, and (5) other types of equity-related securities (including 
warrants). The breakdown of the different securities offerings is presented 
below in Table 2. 
 
 
 53. The original Regulation S did not provide a formal definition of “equity” security. In 
application, debt securities that provided for conversion into an equity security within the one-year 
restricted period for debt securities were considered as equity. Debt securities that provided for 
conversion only after the one-year restricted period for debt were not considered equity. See Lander, 
supra  note 1, at 372–74. The conversion time period for all convertible debt securities in this Article’s 
data set were examined to ensure that the conversion period occurred prior to the end of the one-year 
restricted period.  
     Note that the SEC’s 1998 reforms broadened the definition of “equity” securities to include all 
securities convertible into “stock, warrants, options, rights to purchase stock, and other types of equity-
related securities.” 1998 Amending Release, supra  note 9, at *4. Rule 902(a) states that a “debt 
security” means any security other than an equity security defined in Rule 405 of the Securities Act. 
Securities Act Rule 902(a), 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(a) (1999). Rule 405, in turn, defines an equity 
security to mean  
any stock or similar security . . . or any security convertible, with or without consideration into 
such security, or carrying any warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase such a security; or any 
such warrant or right; or any put, call, straddle, or other option or privilege of buying such security 
from or selling such a security to another without being bound to do so. 
Securities Act Rule 405, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1999). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss2/8
p519 Choi.doc  4/20/01   5:35 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2000] RESALES OF OFFSHORE SECURITIES INTO THE U.S. 537 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Breakdown of Regulation S Offerings by Security Type 
Security 
Number of 
Offerings 
Percent of 
Total Reg S 
Offerings 
Mean 
Offering 
Amount 
($ millions) 
Median 
Offering 
Amount 
($ millions) 
Common 378 53.9% 7.18 1.50 
Preferred Non-Convertible 4 0.6 6.13 7.50 
Preferred Convertible  102 14.6 60.96 4.19 
Debt Convertible 209 29.8 69.50 5.38 
Other 8 1.1 52.93 35.49 
Total 701 100.0 36.43 2.28 
Note that the majority of offerings were for common stock. Common 
stock offerings tended to be for a smaller offering amount, however, with a 
mean of $7.18 million. 
B. Empirical Tests of the Information Effect from a Regulation S Offering 
To test the informational impact of a Regulation S offering, the Article 
examines the U.S. secondary market reaction to an offering using event study 
methodology developed in the finance economics literature.54 To the extent 
the secondary securities market for a particular company is efficient,55 new 
information on the company will become incorporated rapidly and accurately 
into the stock market price.56 
The time window for the Article’s event study is taken from the starting 
date of the offering date to both six weeks and eight weeks after the start of 
the offering. The end date of the time window roughly corresponds with the 
forty-day restricted period relevant for offerings during the Article’s sample
 
 
 54. JOHN Y. CAMPBELL ET AL., T HE ECONOMETRICS OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 149–78 (1997) 
(describing methods of event-study analysis); See Stephen J. Brown & Jerold B. Warner, Measuring 
Security Price Performance, 8 J. FIN. ECON. 205 (1980); A. Craig MacKinlay, Event Studies in 
Economics and Finance, 35 J. ECON. LITERATURE 13, 27 (1997). 
 55. This Article’s data sample restriction to only Exchange Act reporting companies provides 
support for the efficient market assumption. But see supra  note 41 (reporting empirical data on the 
analyst following of Exchange Act reporting companies). 
 56. Many studies use the event study to gauge the wealth effects of new information on 
shareholders.) Jean-Claude Bosch et al., The Competitive Impact of Air Crashes: Stock Market 
Evidence, 41 J. L. & ECON. 503 (1998). For examples of event studies in the legal literature see 
ROBERTA ROMANO, T HE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993).  See Eugene Fama et al., 
The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information, 10 INT’L ECON. REV. 1 (1969). 
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time period.57 The time window is constructed to coincide with the end of 
restricted period because prior to the 1996 SEC reporting reforms, issuers 
were not required specifically to disclose information on the offering.58 
Investors, therefore, may learn of the offering only through the 
commencement of resales into the United States after the restricted period.59 
Conversely, for post-reporting reform offerings, the Article’s event windows 
may be larger than necessary.60 In particular, the expanded event windows 
may be biased against finding a significant abnormal market reaction.61 To 
the extent the Article does find a market reaction that is substantial, therefore, 
the results are more significant. To assess the impact of pre-offering 
disclosures, alternate time windows from two weeks prior to the offering 
again to both six weeks and eight weeks post-offering are used in the event 
study.  
Using daily secondary market returns from the Center for Research on 
Security Prices (“CRSP”),62 the Article then calcula tes the daily return for 
each Regulation S issuer over the event time windows. To assess the impact 
of new information on the daily return, the paper adjusts the return to remove 
the normal expected return. Expected returns are calculated using the market 
 
 
 57. Prior to the SEC’s 1998 reforms, U.S. Exchange Act reporting issuers that sought to sell 
equity abroad through Regulation S faced a 40-day restricted period. See Original Regulation S, 
Securities Act Rule 903(c)(2)(iii) (repealed 1998). Domestic U.S. issuers seeking to sell equity 
securities through Regulation S now face a one-year distribution compliance period. See supra note 13 
(describing the distribution compliance period requirements). Because the forty-day restricted period is 
measured from the close of the offering, see Original Regulation S, Rule 902(m), Securities Act, 
resales may commence even after six weeks from the start of the offering depending on the duration of 
the offering. The eight-week event period is employed in the event study to assess the information 
effects for offerings that may last longer than several days. 
 58. See supra  text accompanying notes 49-50 (discussing materiality and other requirements that 
may have led issuers to disclose their Regulation S offering despite no specific disclosure mandate). 
 59. See Securities Act Rule 903, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903. Indeed, foreign investors have, in the past, 
sold into the United States prior to the expiration of the 40-day waiting period. In 1996, for example, 
the National Association of Securities Dealers Regulation Inc. fined Alex, Brown & Son for assisting 
resales into the U.S. before the end of the 40-day period. See National Association of Securities 
Dealers Inc.: Alex, Brown, Rep Agree to Fines over Sale of Regulation S Securities, 28 SEC. REG. & L. 
REP. 1217 (1996). 
 60. For example, XXSYS Technologies Inc. conducted a $2 million common stock Regulation S 
offering on March 18, 1997 but did not file a Form 8-K reporting on the offering until May 16, 1997, 
almost two months after the offering.  
 61. Expanding the event window to time periods during which no significant information is 
released to the market will, on average, not change the cumulative excess return. On the other hand, 
the standard error will increase, leading to a lower likelihood that the cumulative excess return will be 
statistically significant. 
 62. The Center for Research in Security Prices is based at the University of Chicago Graduate 
School of Business. See <http://gsb-www.uchicago.edu/research/crsp/index.html> (visited Apr. 15, 
2000). 
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model.63 Subtracting the expected return from the actual daily return gives 
the daily excess return. The daily excess return then represents a measure of 
the impact of new information on the secondary market price of the issuer for 
a particular day. Daily excess returns are then summed across time in each 
event window, generating the cumulated excess return (“CER”). Table 3 
reports the mean cumulative excess returns for the selected event windows 
and their statistical significance. 
Table 3: Cumulative Excess Returns from Event Study (All Reg S Offerings) 
Time Window Observations 
Cumulative 
Excess Returns t-statistic  
+0 to +6 Weeks 382 -3.99% -3.177** 
+0 to +8 Weeks 381 -5.36% -3.672** 
-2 to +6 Weeks 379 -4.51% -3.628** 
-2 to +8 Weeks 377 -6.00% -4.021** 
** 5% confidence level.  * 10% conficence level. 
Cumulative Excess Returns from Event Study (Excluding Rule 144A 
Offerings) 
Time Window Observations 
Cumulative 
Excess Returns t-statistic  
+0 to +6 Weeks 300 -3.83% -2.311** 
+0 to +8 Weeks 299 -5.11% -2.668** 
-2 to +6 Weeks 298 -3.82% -2.221** 
-2 to +8 Weeks 296 -5.27% -2.549** 
** 5% confidence level.  * 10% confidence level. 
 
 
 63. The market model treats the return for any security as a function of the total market return. 
For security i, for example, the expected return for time period t ( itR ) is: 
itmtiit RR eba ++=  
where mtR  is the market return and ite  is the zero mean disturbance term. See CAMPBELL ET AL., 
supra  note 54, at 155 (describing the market model). A value-weighted return based on all the 
securities trading on the exchange in which the issuer’s securities are listed is used for the market 
return. The value-weighted return for all NASDAQ securities is used for securities trading on 
NASDAQ. For each security, returns from 260 t rading days to 10 trading days prior to the start of the 
offering are used to estimate the parameters of the market model. 
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Note from Table 3 that after a Regulation S offering, issuers receive a 
significantly negative cumulative excess return. In particular, for all 
Regulation S offerings, the cumulative excess return is -3.99% for the +0 to 
+6 week event window; similarly, for the +0 to +8 week event window, the 
cumulative excess return is -5.36%. For the sample of Regulation S offerings 
excluding Rule 144A-related transactions, the secondary market reacts 
similarly. The cumulative excess return is -3.83% for the +0 to +6 week 
event window; for the +0 to +8 week event window, the cumulative excess 
return is -5.11%. All the CERs reported in Table 3 are significant at the 5% 
confidence level.64 
The evidence from the event study is consistent with the hypothesis that 
news of a Regulation S offering results in a negative reaction on average in 
the U.S. securities markets. On the one hand, U.S. investors that purchase a 
particular Regulation S issuer’s securities prior to disclosure are harmed, as 
the information about the offering results in a negative return. On the other 
hand, U.S. investors that sell prior to information disclosure are 
correspondingly benefited. The harm from the information signal due to a 
Regulation S offering, therefore, is no different than the harm from any other 
form of negative information disclosure. Only where foreign investors are 
able to sell prior to release of the Regulation S offering news into the market 
are U.S. investors as a group systematically harmed from the secondary 
market’s pre-offering overvaluation of the issuer’s securities. 
To test the factors driving the market reaction to a Regulation S offering, 
this Article estimates a multivariate ordinary least-squares model using the 
eight-week cumulative excess return as the dependent variable. Five sets of 
independent variables are included in the model. 
First, the model includes independent variables related to the 
informational disadvantage at which outside investors may find themselves 
relative to management. The lower the informational disadvantage, the less 
likely the offering will provide a signal that the market has overvalued the 
issuer’s securities. The model uses the natural log of the market capitalization 
of the issuer as a proxy for the informational disadvantage that outside 
investors face.65 Analysts are more likely to follow companies with a greater 
market capitalization, reducing the informational disadvantage against 
outside investors. Greater market capitalization, therefore, should lead to a 
reduced negative market reaction to the offering, all other things being equal. 
 
 
 64. Test statistics for significance based on the Student-t distribution are calculated using the 
method described in Brown and Warner, supra  note 54, at 28-29. 
 65. The natural log transformation is used to generate a more normally distributed independent 
variable for the market capitalization of the issuer. 
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Second, the model includes the natural log of the offering amount to 
market capitalization ratio.66 The larger the offering amount, the greater the 
signal sent to that market that management believes the company’s stock is 
overvalued. All other things being equal, the gain from the sale of overvalued 
securities into the market is larger the more securities that are sold into the 
market. Managers, therefore, will tend to make larger offerings when they 
believe the company’s securities are overvalued. Moreover, the size of the 
offering relative to the issuer’s total market capitalization is important. The 
market will interpret an attempt to make an offering of $1 million where the 
issuer has a market capitalization of $1 million as a stronger signal of 
overvaluation than an offering of $1 million where the market capitalization 
is $100 million. 
Third, the model includes independent variables relating to the incentives 
of managers. In particular, managers may exploit the offering for their own 
purposes. Some managers may engage in self-dealing by selling securities to 
themselves at greatly discounted prices at the expense of shareholders.67 The 
U.S. market may react negatively to insider self-dealing for two reasons: 
first, the shares of non-insider investors are diluted in value and second, the 
self-dealing sends a signal that managers may be more likely to engage in 
subsequent self-dealing activities. The fraction of the board composed of 
corporate officers and the fraction of shares beneficially owned by officers 
and directors are included in the model to control for the possibility of insider 
self-dealing. The greater the fraction of officers on the board of directors, the 
more likely managers may use the offering for their own purposes.68 In 
contrast, the greater the fraction of shares beneficially owned by officers and 
directors the less likely that managers will conduct an offering that dilutes 
their share value.69 Nevertheless, at lower levels of officer and director share 
ownership, an incremental increase in ownership may help to entrench 
management, leading to an increased willingness for managers to act 
 
 
 66. The natural log transformation is used to generate a more normally distributed independent 
variable for the offering amount to market capitalization ratio. 
 67. For example, in 1997, Cheniere Energy, Inc. sold securities through Regulation S to an 
overseas investor using Investors Administration Services, Ltd. as its placement agent. One of the 
principals of the placement agent was the brother of the Chairman of Cheniere Energy. See Cheniere 
Energy, Inc., Form 8-K (Aug. 27, 1997), available in  EDGAR, SEC Archives, datafile. Managers may 
also make suboptimal use of the offering proceeds, increasing the managers’ own welfare at the 
expense of all the issuer’s shareholders. See supra  notes 22-23 and accompanying text. 
 68. The composition of each Regulation S issuer’s board of directors was obtained through 
examination of the issuer’s proxy filing with the SEC for the year of the offering.  
 69. The beneficial ownership of common shares for the group of all directors and officers, as 
reported in the Regulation S issuer’s SEC proxy filing for the year of the offering, is used as a measure 
of the share ownership of directors and officers.  
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opportunistically in a Regulation S offering. To control for this possible 
nonlinearity, the model includes a squared term for the beneficial share 
ownership of directors and officers. The model also includes a dummy 
variable for purchasers that obtain a board seat as part of the offering. Where 
a purchaser obtains a board seat, the purchaser may provide greater 
monitoring services of management for the benefit of all shareholders, 
resulting in a more positive market reaction. 
Fourth, the model controls for the offering’s stated use of proceeds, 
because investors may value an offering differently depending on how the 
issuer plans to use the proceeds. For example, the market may react 
differently to an issuer planning to expand into new markets than to an issuer 
that simply states the proceeds will be used to repay debt.70 The use of 
proceeds for each offering is identified through examination of press releases 
and SEC filing information on the offerings. In cases where multiple uses of 
proceeds were cited, the first stated use is recorded as the main use of 
proceeds. Where no use of proceeds is mentioned, the offering is assigned to 
the “general corporate purposes” use of proceeds category.71 Dummy 
variables for whether proceeds will be used for working capital, product 
development, capital expenditure, business expansion, balance sheet 
strengthening, or the repayment of debts are added to the model to compare 
against the baseline general corporate purposes use of proceeds.72 
 
 
 70. In this Article’s sample of Regulation S offerings, 21 offerings stated business expansion as 
the first use of proceeds and 29 offerings stated debt repayment as the first use of proceeds. See infra 
table, note 72. 
 71. In addition, 15 Regulation S offerings explicitly stated a “general corporate purposes” use of 
proceeds.  
 72. The table below provides a breakdown of the Regulation S offerings by the use of proceeds. 
Where more than one use of proceeds is cited in the Regulation S disclosure, the first stated use of 
proceeds is taken as the use of proceeds for the offering. Note the frequency for the “General 
Corporate Purposes” category includes only those offerings that explicitly stated a “General Corporate 
Purposes” use of proceeds. The baseline “General Corporate Purposes” category used in the article’s 
CER model includes both offerings that explicitly state the “General Corporate Purposes” use of 
proceeds as well as offerings that state no explicit use of proceeds.  
Table: Use of Proceeds Breakdown for the Regulation S Offerings 
Use of Proceeds Frequency Percentage  
Working Capital 34 19.4% 
Product Development 25 14.3% 
Debt Repayment 29 16.6% 
Build Facilities 10 5.7% 
Acquisition 24 13.7% 
Business Expansion 21 12.0% 
Balance Sheet 17 9.7% 
General Corporate Purposes 15 8.6% 
Total 175 100.0% 
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Similarly, the greater the number of international contacts the issuer has, 
the less suspect will be the issuer’s motive in making an international 
securities offerings. Contacts overseas may take the form of factories or other 
productive enterprises abroad or overseas export markets to which the 
company sells. To capture this possibility, the model includes the number of 
countries in which the firm either conducted operations or sold products and 
services. For each Regulation S issuer, the number of countries in which the 
firm either conducted operations or sold products and services was collected 
through examination of each firm’s SEC 10-K filing in the offering year.73 
Finally, the model includes a set of controls for the type of offering. A 
dummy variable for whether the offered security is common stock is added to 
the model to control for the possibility that the market reacts differently to 
changes in the outstanding capital stock of the issuer that involve common 
stock as opposed to preferred stock or convertible debt securities. Similarly, a 
dummy variable for whether the offering is a Rule 144A-related Regulation 
S offering is used in the model. Rule 144A offerings typically involve larger 
market capitalization issuers selling significant amounts of securities to 
institutional investors.74 Consequently, the U.S. secondary market may 
interpret a Rule 144A offering differently.75 
Table 5 reports the results from the model for the entire set of Regulation 
S offerings. Because the market receives more timely information on 
Regulation S offering after the SEC’s reporting reforms, the market reaction 
to news of a Regulation S offering may differ for offerings made after 
reporting reform. Table 5 therefore also reports the model estimated only for 
Regulation S offerings that occurred after the SEC reporting reforms took 
effect in November 1996. 
 
 
  
 73. This Article calculates the number of world contacts as follows: for each specific country 
mentioned in the Form 10-K filing, the number of world contacts is increased by 1. Where the issuer’s 
Form 10-K only mentions a particular continent, the average number of contacts other issuers in the 
Article’s sample had in the particular continent, conditional on the issuers’ having at least one contact, 
is used as the number of contacts for that continent. For example, in the entire sample, companies that 
listed at least one country in Europe on average listed 5 European countries. Issuers that listed Europe, 
therefore, have their number of world contacts increased by 5. 
 74. See supra  notes 51-52 and accompanying text (describing the requirements of a Rule 144A 
offering). 
 75. For example, the high market capitalization and the presence of reputable institutional 
investors in Rule 144A offerings may lead the market  to view the offering as one providing a 
decreased risk of overvalued resales into the United States.  
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Table 5: OLS Model of 8-Week Cumulative Excess Return 
Independent Variables 
All Regulation S 
Offerings 
Post SEC-
Reporting 
Reform 
Offerings Only 
Natural Log of Market Capitalization 0.006 -0.002 
 (0.326) (-0.062) 
Natural Log of the Offering Amount to -0.043** -0.095** 
Market Capitalization Ratio (-2.403) (-3.135) 
Dummy Variable for Common Stock 0.040 0.066 
 (0.897) (0.883) 
Dummy Variable for 144A Offering 0.055 0.116 
 (0.757) (0.870) 
Fraction of Board Comprised of  -0.065 0.140 
Officers (-0.574) (0.683) 
Fraction of Common Stock owned by  -0.168 -0.202 
Directors and Officers (MDHOLD) (-0.537) (-0.378) 
MDHOLD^2 0.113 0.071 
 (0.248) (0.099) 
Dummy Variable for New Board Seat 0.335** 0.574** 
 (2.207) (2.694) 
Number of World Contacts -0.006* -0.005 
 (-1.906) (-0.912) 
Dummy Variable for General  Base Base 
Corporate Purposes   
Dummy Variable for Working Capital -0.014 -0.083 
 (-0.150) (-0.671) 
Dummy Variable for Product  0.226** -0.013 
Development (2.915) (-0.069) 
Dummy Variable for Capital  0.094 0.105 
Expenditures (0.825) (0.698) 
Dummy Variable for Business  0.122 0.266 
Expansion (1.197) (1.328) 
Dummy Variable for Acquisition -0.037 0.068 
 (-0.426) (0.572) 
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Dummy Variable for Balance Sheet 0.113 0.216 
 (1.058) (1.067) 
Dummy Variable for Debt Repayment -0.046 -0.056 
 (-0.595) (-0.436) 
Constant -0.131 -0.358** 
 (-1.300) (-2.264) 
Observations 317 124 
F-value 1.90** 1.67** 
Adjusted R2 0.044 0.080 
** 5% confidence level;. * 10% confidence level. F-value tests the joint 
hypothesis that all regression coefficients equal zero. 
From Table 5 note three points. First, the coefficient on the natural log of 
the offering amount to market capitalization ratio is negative and significant 
at the 5% confidence level for both the entire sample of offerings and the 
post-SEC reporting reform offerings. The more securities that managers 
attempt to sell into the market, the greater the negative reaction in the market. 
This may indicate that the stock market price of an issuer responds negatively 
to a signal that managers believe the issuer’s common stock is overvalued. 
Nevertheless, the evidence is also consistent with the possibility that the 
negative market reaction is the result of price pressure from the increased 
volume of securities arising from resales of the Regulation S securities into 
the United States.76 
Second, offerings in which the purchaser obtains a board seat result in a 
more positive reaction to the offering. The coefficient on the dummy variable 
for the purchase of a board seat is positive in both models (significant at the 
5% level for all Regulation S offerings and the post-SEC reporting reform 
offerings). Where a clear purpose exists for the Regulation S offering, as 
indicated through the attainment of a board seat by the purchaser, there is less 
likelihood that the offering is conducted solely because managers believe the 
company’s stock is overvalued. The purchase of a board seat by the foreign 
 
 
 76. See Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums? Market Price, Fair Value, 
and Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235 (1990) (discussing the argument that investors hold 
heterogenous beliefs with respect to securities valuation and that securities demand is therefore a 
downward sloping function). But see RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE 345-46 (5th ed. 1996) (noting that the efficient market theory leads to the 
conclusion that the demand curve for a security investment is perfectly elastic); Alfred E. Osborne, Jr., 
Rule 144A Volume Limitations and the Sale of Restricted Stock in the Over-The-Counter Market, 37 J. 
FIN. 505, 514 (1982) (finding no relationship between the market reaction to Rule 144A resales and 
the size of the transaction). 
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investor also may indicate increased oversight of management to the benefit 
of shareholders generally. Therefore, the market reacts more positively to 
such offerings. 
Third, weak evidence exists that the market reaction varies depending on 
the issuer’s stated use of proceeds. For the sample of all Regulation S 
offerings, the coefficient on the dummy variable for product development use 
of proceeds was positive and significant at the 5% level (although negative 
and insignificant for offerings after the 1996 reporting reform). Likewise, the 
dummy variable for business expansion use of proceeds is positive 
(insignificant, however, for all Regulation S offerings; significant at only the 
20% level for post-SEC reporting reform offerings). Both working capital 
and debt repayment, on the other hand, correlate with a more negative market 
reaction relative to general corporate purposes; neither dummy variable, 
however, is statistically insignificant. 
C. Tests of the Overvaluation Resale Hypothesis 
The market’s negative reaction to Regulation S offerings is consistent 
with both the hypothesis that managers are able to use foreign investors to 
distribute securities at overvalued prices to unsuspecting U.S. investors (the 
“overvaluation resale hypothesis”) and the competing hypothesis that 
managers are unable to take advantage of overvaluation through Regulation 
S because the market reacts too quickly to news of the Regulation S 
offering.77 This section examines the relationship between the expected 
market reaction to a Regulation S offering with the offering discount to test 
directly the overvaluation resale hypothesis. 
In a recent empirical study, Professors Aggarwal, Gray, and Singer also 
provided a test of the ability of issuers to use Regulation S to sell overvalued 
securities indirectly to U.S. investors.78 Using a sample of 192 Regulation S 
offerings from the pre-reporting reform period, they reported that offerings in 
their data sample consisted of primarily smaller market capitalization firms.79 
Foreign investors of Regulation S offerings from their sample also received 
large discounts.80 Testing whether issuers were “gaming the system” through 
 
 
 77. See supra  41-42 (discussing how the U.S. market may learn of a Regulation S offering even 
without any disclosure from the issuer). 
 78. See Reena Aggarwal et al., Capital Raising in the Offshore Market, 23 J. BANKING & FIN. 
1181, 1190-91 (1999). 
 79. See id. Aggarwal, Gray, and Singer report that during the period before the SEC reporting 
reform, the median market capitalization of reporting firms was $16.82 million. Id. at 1188. 
 80. Aggarwal, Gray, and Singer report that the mean discount was 32.84% during the pre-SEC 
reporting reform period and 21.67% in the post -reporting reform period. Id. at 1189. 
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sales of discounted securities to foreign investors timed to enable the foreign 
investors to resell into the United States prior to information disclosure on 
the offering, Aggarwal, Gray, and Singer provided evidence that a significant 
fraction of offerings were sold to foreign investors with enough lead time 
before the next Form 10-Q filing to give the investors the ability to resell into 
the United States prior to the secondary market reaction to news of the 
offering.81 The authors reported that offerings that in fact granted investors 
the ability to resell ahead of the secondary market reaction were sold at a 
greater discount to the foreign investors.82  
The findings from the Aggarwal, Gray, and Singer study, however, are 
vulnerable to several criticisms. First, the greater discount they report for 
offerings that provide investors the ability to resell ahead of the secondary 
market reaction to news of the offering is not statistically significant.83 
Moreover, as discussed above, foreign investors will negotiate for a greater 
discount precisely when they are unable to sell prior to the secondary market 
reaction.84 Second, Aggarwal, Gray, and Singer’s data sample of 192 
offerings from the pre SEC-reporting reform time period may miss many 
Regulation S offerings and thus contain sample bias. In particular, the 
authors searched only Form 10-Q filings in constructing their sample.85 
Issuers, however, may disclose a Regulation S offering through press 
releases and other forms of SEC filings, including Form 10-K filings.86 
 
 
 81. See id . at 1191. 
 82. See id. (reporting that offerings sold with the “option” to resell into the United States prior to 
the next scheduled Form 10-Q disclosure had a mean discount of 35.77% in comparison to the mean 
discount of 20.00% at which offerings without such an option were sold). 
 83. See id . 
 84. See supra  Part II (discussing the relationship between the offering discount and the expected 
market reaction to news of the Regulation S offering). Aggarwal, Gray, & Singer do not recognize the 
possibility that part of the offering discount may be due to compensation to foreign investors for an 
inability to resell into the United States prior to the secondary market reaction to news of the 
Regulation S offering. Instead, they write simply: “The substantial discounts imply large losses for 
existing U.S. investors who may not even have been aware of these offerings before the rule change 
and this has also been a cause for concern.” Aggarwal et  al., supra  note 78, at 1188. 
 85. See Aggarwal et al., supra  note 78, at 1186-87. 
 86. Aggarwal, Gray & Singer also conduct an event study around information disclosure of a 
Regulation S offering and find no statistically significant cumulative excess market return. See 
Aggarwal et al., supra  note 78, at 1192-93. They, however, focus on only the filing date of the Form 
10-Q immediately after the Regulation S offering. See id. As discussed above, see supra  text 
accompanying note 82, using the Form-Q filing date is unreliable because information on the offering 
may reach the market prior to the filing date. In the alternative, because issuers had no direct 
compulsion to disclose information on the offering in the Form 10-Q prior to the SEC’s reporting 
reform, information on the offering may reach the market—through an increase in trading volume, for 
example—well after the Form 10-Q filing date. This Article’s larger event window, therefore, provides 
a more accurate representation of the time period in which the market learns of the Regulation S 
offering.  
 Similar to this Article’s finding of a negative market reaction for Regulation S offerings, 
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To test the overvaluation resale hypothesis directly, the Article relies on 
the following theoretical distinction. As discussed in Part II above, foreign 
investors that expect to resell after the securities markets have reacted to 
news of a Regulation S offering will demand an offering discount equal to 
the expected negative market reaction, all other things being equal.87 In 
contrast, where foreign investors expect to resell prior to the market reaction, 
they do not need compensation for the entire expected negative market 
reaction. Instead, managers in such situations will attempt to sell to foreign 
investors at as high a price as possible to provide the corporation with greater 
proceeds at the expense of U.S. investors that eventually purchase from the 
foreign investors. Although foreign investors may negotiate for a share of the 
company’s gain from the overvaluation, the discount they receive will 
necessarily be less than the discount foreign investors who expect to resell 
only post-disclosure will obtain.88 
Now consider the pre- and post-SEC reporting reform periods 
respectively. Post-SEC reporting reform, because the market learns of the 
Regulation S offering well before resales may commence, foreign investors 
will demand compensation for the expected negative market reaction, leading 
to an increased discount, all other things being equal. Whether the offering 
discounts received by foreign investors pre- and post-SEC reform are similar 
in magnitude depends on the validity of the overvaluation resale hypothesis. 
On the one hand, where foreign investors expect to resell prior to disclosure 
of the offering to the market, the discount they demand will be lower prior to 
 
 
Professors Kang, Kim, Park, and Stulz report a negative abnormal return to the announcement of an 
offshore convertible debt offering by a sample of U.S. issuers chosen to match a corresponding sample 
of Japanese issuers of equity-related debt securities. See Jun-Koo Kang et al., An Analysis of the 
Wealth Effects of Japanese Offshore Dollar-Denominated Convertible and Warrant Bond Issues, 30 J. 
FIN. QUANT. ANALYSIS 257, 264 (1995) (reporting a statistically significant abnormal return of -1.35% 
for offshore U.S. convertible debt issues). 
 In a study of equity private placements into the United States from 1979 to 1985, Professor 
Wruck, in contrast, finds a positive secondary market reaction to news of an offering. See Karen 
Hopper Wruck, Equity Ownership Concentration and Firm Value: Evidence from Private Equity 
Financing, 23 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 8-9 (1989). In particular, where share concentration increases as a result 
of the offering, the secondary market reaction is even more positive. See id. at 10—23 (arguing that 
greater share concentration leads to both the increased monitoring of management and a raised 
probability of an eventual takeover). Professor Wruck theorizes that private equity placements 
typically involve fewer purchasers able to negotiate with management for access to non-public 
information to gauge the value of the company. Private placement investors, therefore, face a reduced 
risk of purchasing overvalued securities; the public secondary market, as a result, assesses a different 
probability of overvaluation from news of a private placement than for a public offering. See id. at 10. 
 87. See supra  text accompanying notes 30-36 (discussing the relationship between the offering 
discount and the expected secondary market reactions to news of the Regulation S offering). 
 88. See supra  Part I (discussing issuers’ incentive to give foreign investors a discount in the 
Regulation S offering). 
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SEC reporting reforms. On the other hand, to the extent the market is 
expected to learn of a Regulation S offering prior to resales,89 foreign 
investors will again demand compensation for the expected negative market 
reaction even prior to SEC reporting reforms. Table 6 summarizes the 
Article’s hypotheses and predictions: 
Table 6: Summary of the Test of the Overvaluation Resale Hypothesis 
Hypothesis Prediction 
No resales prior to information 
disclosure 
Mean Pre-Reform Discount = Mean 
Post-Reform Discount 
Foreign investors engage in resales 
prior to information disclosure pre-SEC 
reporting reform (selling overvalued 
securities to U.S. investors) 
Mean Pre-Reform Discount < Mean 
Post-Reform Discount 
To test whether foreign investors are able to resell prior to disclosure of 
the Regulation S offering prior to the 1996 reporting reforms, the Article 
examines the offering discount relative to the U.S. secondary market price 
for the issuer’s common stock at the start of the offering for offerings made 
before and after the SEC’s reporting reforms. For securities convertible into 
the issuer’s common stock, the Article uses the conversion price into equity 
as the Regulation S offering price. The conversion price is measured at the 
first possible date of conversion and assumes the secondary market price at 
the time of conversion equals the secondary market price at the start of the 
offering date. Table 7 reports the summary of the offering discount data 
below.90 
Table 7: Summary of the Regulation S Offering Discount Pre- and Post-SEC 
Reporting Reform 
Type of 
Offering Observations 
Mean 
Discount 
25% 
Quartile 
Median 
Discount 
75% 
Quartile 
Pre-Reporting 
Reform 263 18.81% 39.05% 18.15% -1.75% 
Post-Reporting 
Reform 213 13.56% 30.00% 20.00% -10.00% 
(t-test of difference in means p-value = 0.0848*). 
 
 
 89. The initiation of resales into the United States, for example, may alert analysts to the 
possibility of a Regulation S offering. See supra  notes 39-40 and accompanying text(discussing how 
the U.S. market may learn of a Regulation S offering even without any disclosure by the issuer). 
 90. See supra  note 18 (defining offering discount for purposes of this article). 
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Excluding Rule 144A Offerings 
Type of 
Offering Observations 
Mean 
Discount 
25% 
Quartile  
Median 
Discount 
75% 
Quartile  
Pre-Reporting 
Reform 226 24.97% 41.82% 25.00% 9.00% 
Post-Reporting 
Reform 174 22.13% 35.00% 25.00% 11.97% 
(t-test of difference in means p-value = 0.3539). 
Table 7 provides evidence against the overvaluation resale hypothesis. 
The mean offering discount decreases, rather than increases, in magnitude 
post-reform. For the entire sample of Regulation S offerings, the discount 
decreases from a mean of 18.81% to 13.56% (difference significant at the 
10% level). The presence of Rule 144A offerings in the sample may skew the 
mean Regulation S discount. Rule 144A Regulation S offerings of 
convertible debt securities typically are sold with a conversion right into the 
issuer’s common stock. The conversion premium, moreover, is usually set at 
above 10% relative to the U.S. secondary market price for common stock at 
the time of the offering to meet the non-fungibility requirement of Rule 
144A, resulting in a downward bias in the mean discount for the pool of all 
Regulation S offerings.91 Table 7 reports, nevertheless, that for the sample of 
only non-Rule 144A Regulation S offerings, the discount also decreases from 
24.97% to 22.13%; moreover, the difference is statistically insignificant. 
Moreover, the median discount remains the same at 25.00% for the non-Rule 
144A offerings. Looking at the difference in the mean offering discount from 
the pre- to post-reporting reform time period, therefore, provides no evidence 
that foreign investors were able to engage in pre-disclosure resales at 
overvalued prices to U.S. investors. 
The lack of an increase in the magnitude of the offering discount during 
the post-SEC reporting reform period, however, may be due to a number of 
other factors that may reduce the size of the offering discount during the 
post-reporting reform period. In particular, a shift may have occurred in the 
types of Regulation S offerings occurring post-reporting reform. Even though 
a decrease in the ability of issuers to use Regulation S to engage in resales of 
overvalued securities may lead to an increased discount post-reform,92 a shift 
in the pool of offerings may mask the increase with an even greater decrease 
 
 
 91. See supra  note 51 (describing the non-fungibility requirement for Rule 144A resales). 
 92. See supra  Part I (providing a theoretical discussion for the relationship between the offering 
discount and the expected market reaction to news of a Regulation S offering). 
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of the offering discount. 
This Article therefore provides controls for changes in: (a) the liquidity of 
the Regulation S securities during the restricted period overseas; (b) the risk 
foreign investors face that they themselves may misprice the Regulation S 
securities; and (c) the incentive of managers to act opportunistically through 
a Regulation S offering. 
First, the liquidity of the Regulation S securities sold prior to the SEC 
reporting reforms may differ from the liquidity of securities sold after the 
reporting reforms. Some have argued, for example, that the reporting reforms 
increased the “respectability” of Regulation S offerings, leading to larger 
market capitalization issuers selling securities.93 To the extent larger market 
capitalization issuers have greater international contacts and, as a result, more 
of their securities trade in liquid markets overseas, one would expect that 
foreign investors would demand a reduced discount from these issuers. Thus, 
issuers and foreign investors may have been able to use Regulation S to sell 
overvalued securities into the United States prior to the reporting reforms. 
Nevertheless, the discount did not increase after the reporting reforms due to 
the shift in offerings toward more liquid Regulation S securities. 
Second, foreign investors may demand a discount in part to compensate 
for the mispricing risk they face due to their information disadvantage 
relative to the issuer’s management. Where foreign investors purchase with a 
view to hold the securities, for example, they face the risk that the securities 
are overvalued. Similarly, foreigners purchasing with a view to resell into the 
United States face a risk of mispricing the degree of overvaluation in the 
United States, leading to insufficient compensation from the issuer for the 
expected negative secondary market reaction prior to resale. A difference in 
the mispricing risk foreign investors bear after the reporting reforms, in turn, 
may account for a decrease in the discount they demand post-reform. To the 
extent larger, more well-followed companies tend to issue securities under 
Regulation S with greater frequency post-SEC reporting reform, investors 
may demand a lower discount than they would for the lower market 
capitalization companies more prevalent pre-reporting reforms. As with a 
possible increase in overseas liquidity, this shift in the risk facing foreign 
investors may mask any increase in the offering discount post-reporting 
reforms. 
Third, the Regulation S discount may simply be the result of managers 
engaging in self-dealing, using Regulation S to sell securities at a large 
 
 
 93. See Aggarwal et al., supra  note 78, at 1189 (“Conversations with industry officials suggest 
that larger firms are using the Regulation S market more [post -SEC reporting reform] because it is not 
seen as ‘shady’ anymore.”). 
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discount to themselves. Alternatively, the discount may result from the 
dilution foreign investors expect from managers using a Regulation S 
offering to engage in a suboptimal capital investment designed to improve 
the managers’ own private welfare.94 To the extent managerial opportunism 
became less prevalent post-reporting reform, due for example to the greater 
publicity surrounding Regulation S offerings, one would expect the offering 
discount to decrease post-reporting reform and counter any increase due to 
the reduction in the ability to conduct overvalued resales into the United 
States. 
To control for these exogenous shifts in the pool of Regulation S offering 
after the SEC’s reporting reforms, this Article constructs a multivariate 
ordinary least-squares model with the Regulation S offering discount as the 
dependent variable. The ordinary least-squares model of the offering 
discount includes several categories of independent variables. 
First, the model includes independent variables relating to the liquidity 
foreign investors expect after purchasing the offering. Offerings that provide 
foreign investors with a high degree of liquidity outside the United States 
should receive a reduced discount, all other things being equal. This is 
incorporated in the model by including the natural log of the offering amount 
to market capitalization ratio. Where only a small fraction of an issuer’s 
outstanding capitalization is sold abroad, trading activity will gravitate back 
to the United States, where most securities are located. Conversely, the 
greater the offering amount sold abroad in relation to the total market 
capitalization, the greater is the likelihood of a significant resale market 
overseas. In addition, the model includes the number of world contacts as an 
independent variable.95 The greater the number of world contacts, the more 
likely that a significant number of overseas investors may follow the issuer 
leading to the development of a foreign resale market. 
Second, the model includes variables to account for the risk to foreign 
investors of mispricing Regulation S securities purchased from the issuer 
during the Regulation S offering. The natural log of the market capitalization 
may correlate with the mispricing risk that foreign investors face. The greater 
the market capitalization of the issuer, on average, the larger is the number of 
analysts that will follow the company. The more analysts following the 
company, the less asymmetric informational advantage managers will 
possess over foreign investors, and therefore, the less risk foreign investors 
will face. The number of world contacts independent variable also acts as a 
 
 
 94. See supra  notes 22-23 and accompanying text.  
 95. See supra  note 73 (describing the Article’s methodology in calculating the number of world 
contacts for each Regulation S issuer). 
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proxy for the overvaluation risk foreign investors face. The greater the 
number of world contacts, the more likely that the foreign investors will have 
good information on the issuer. 
Third, the model includes variables relating to the incentive of managers 
to engage in opportunistic self-dealing or suboptimal capital investments. 
Where managers are engaged in self-dealing through the Regulation S 
offering, one would expect a greater discount. The fraction of the board of 
directors composed of insiders and the fraction of outstanding common stock 
beneficially owned by directors and officers therefore are included in the 
model. Greater management presence on the board may lead to greater 
insulation against shareholder action, increasing the incidence of 
opportunistic Regulation S offerings. In contrast, the greater the fraction of 
shares in the hands of insiders, the more harm insiders face from any dilution 
resulting from such opportunistic actions. At lower levels of director and 
officer share ownership, however, incremental increases in ownership may 
help entrench management, leading to greater managerial opportunism. To 
control for this possible nonlinearity, the model includes a squared 
transformation of the director and officer share ownership variable.  
Fourth, the model includes the reaction that foreign investors expect the 
U.S. secondary market to have to the offering. The more negative the 
expected market reaction, the greater discount one would expect foreign 
investors to demand in cases where they expect to resell only after the market 
reaction. As a proxy for the expected market reaction, this Article uses the 
actual cumulative excess return in U.S. secondary markets following the 
offering. Two variations of the model are fitted. The first model uses the six-
week cumulative excess return (calculated from +0 to +6 weeks) as an 
independent variable; the eight-week cumulative excess return (calculated 
from +0 to +8 weeks) is fitted in the second model. The Appendix discusses 
and controls for a possible simultaneity bias between the offering discount 
and the cummulative excess return. 
Fifth, the model includes a series of controls for the type of offering. An 
independent variable for whether the offering is for common stock is added 
to the model. For securities convertible into common stock, the calculated 
offering discount may not accurately reflect the offering discount an investor 
would have negotiated for the issuer’s common stock directly. On one hand, 
the conversion price does represent the price the foreign investor would have 
to pay to obtain common shares if they chose to convert. Nevertheless, the 
foreign investor also enjoys the option not to convert. Because the option not 
to convert is valuable, for instance, the foreign investor may accept a higher 
conversion price (resulting in a reduced calculated offering discount) in 
return for the option not to convert. Similarly, the model includes an 
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independent variable for whether the offering is part of a Rule 144A 
placement. Foreign investors that partake in a Rule 144A offering and 
therefore enjoy the prospect of liquid resales into the PORTAL market 
through Rule 144A will demand a lower discount.96 For convertible 
securities sold through Rule 144A, the minimum 10% conversion premium 
into common stock to meet the non-fungibility requirement will also result in 
a reduced mean offering discount.97 
Sixth, the geographical region of the offshore offering may affect the 
discount. To the extent Europe provides greater regulatory protections and a 
more liquid capital market, investors may demand a reduced discount, for 
example. The model therefore includes a series of geographic region dummy 
variables (with Europe as the base).98 
Finally, to test the impact of the November 1996 reporting reforms on the 
overall level of the Regulation S offering discount, a dummy variable for 
whether the offering is made before or after the reporting reforms is included 
in the model. Table 8 reports the results from the offering discount model 
fitted for the six-week and the eight-week cumulative excess returns. 
Table 8: OLS Models of the Regulation S Offering Discount 
Independent Variables 
OLS Model of 
Offering Discount 
using 6-Week 
CER 
OLS Model of 
Offering Discount 
using 8-Week 
CER 
Natural Log of Market Capitalization -0.027 -0.028 
 (-0.996) (-1.065) 
Natural Log of the Offering Amount to -0.027 -0.026 
Market Capitalization Ratio (-1.110) (-1.104) 
Number of World Contacts -0.004 -0.005 
 (-0.853) (-0.996) 
 
 
 96. See supra  note 52 (description of the PORTAL market). 
 97. See supra  note 51 (describing the non-fungibility requirement for Rule 144A resales). 
 98. The geographical location of the majority of offshore offerings in the data set, however, is 
unknown. Moreover, because issuers voluntarily self-report t he geographical location of the offering, 
the sub-sample of offerings where the geographical location is known may not be representative of the 
entire sample of offerings. Both the 6- and 8-week CER offering discount models are re-estimated 
with the exclusion of the geographic location variables (6-week model: 288 observations with a 0.434 
adjusted R2; 8-week model: 288 observations with a 0.440 adjusted R2). The dummy variable for the 
Pre-Reporting Reform period is positive in both re-estimated models, consistent with the qualitative 
results in Table 8 (statistically insignificant in the 6-week CER model and significant at only the 10% 
level in the 8-week CER model). 
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Dummy Variable for Common Stock 0.081 0.076 
 (1.327) (1.273) 
Dummy Variable for 144A Offering -0.226* -0.230** 
 (-1.937) (-2.020) 
Fraction of Board Comprised of Officers 0.416** 0.400** 
 (2.281) (2.231) 
Fraction of Common Stock owned by  -0.126 -0.111 
Directors and Officers (MDHOLD) (-0.265) (-0.239) 
MDHOLD^2 0.146 0.151 
 (0.201) (0.212) 
6 Week Cumulative Excess Return -0.204** . 
 (-2.215)  
8 Week Cumulative Excess Return . -0.214** 
  (-2.817) 
Dummy for Pre-Reporting Reform  0.018 0.021 
Period (0.318) (0.376) 
Dummy Variable for Europe Base Base 
   
Dummy Variable for Canada -0.014 -0.008 
 (-0.163) (-0.098) 
Dummy Variable for Asia  -0.028 -0.014 
 (-0.300) (-0.159) 
Dummy Variable for Middle East -0.187 -0.183 
 (-0.980) (-1.005) 
Dummy Variable for Latin/South  0.106 0.090 
America (1.611) (1.405) 
Dummy Variable for Other (including  -0.418 -0.408 
Africa) (-1.707) (-1.716) 
Constant -0.017 -0.001 
 (-0.110) (-0.001) 
Observations 89 89 
F-Value 4.63** 5.00** 
Adjusted R2 0.382 0.405 
** 5% confidence level. * 10% confidence level. F-value tests the joint 
hypothesis that all regression coefficients equal zero. 
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The results from Table 8 provide additional evidence against the 
overvaluation resale hypothesis. First note that the coefficients for both the 
six- and eight-week cumulative excess returns are negative. A more negative 
secondary market reaction, therefore, correlates with a larger discount from 
the U.S. secondary market price measured at the start date of the offering. 
This finding provides evidence that foreign investors demand compensation 
for the expected drop in market prices. The coefficient is significant at the 
5% level for both the six-week and eight-week cumulative excess return 
independent variables. 
Second, note that the dummy variable for whether the offering occurs 
prior to the 1996 SEC reporting reforms is positive and statistically 
insignificant for both versions of the model in Table 8. Offerings that occur 
prior to the SEC reporting reforms receive a statistically indistinguishable 
offering discount from offerings that occur after the SEC reporting reform. In 
contrast, the overvaluation resale hypothesis predicts that offerings prior to 
the reporting reforms where foreign investors are able to resell prior to 
disclosure of the offering to the market should receive a reduced discount. 
Even after controlling for other factors that may affect the offering discount, 
the results in Table 8 do not support the hypothesis that foreign investors 
were able to resell pre-disclosure prior to the 1996 SEC reporting reforms. 
D. Potential Shortcomings of the Empirical Tests 
Despite the controls for some factors that may have affected Regulation S 
offerings after the 1996 reporting reform, other exogenous factors exist that 
may have independently caused the offering discount to drop after the 
reporting reforms, masking an increase in the discount consistent with the 
overvaluation resale hypothesis. First, the pre-reporting period sample of 
Regulation S offerings used in the Article may miss a greater percentage of 
smaller offerings than the post-reporting period sample.99 This bias, in turn, 
may result in an observed pre-reporting reform offering discount that is 
different from the true discount for the entire population of pre-reporting 
reform offerings. To the extent, however, that issuers typically bear a larger 
offering discount for a smaller offering to compensate for greater illiquidity 
risk on the part of foreign investors, one would expect the lack of smaller 
offerings to result in a reduced discount for the pre-reporting reform period. 
Thus, the bias should raise the probability of finding an increase in the 
offering discount post-reporting reform in support of the overvaluation resale 
 
 
 99. See supra  text accompanying notes 49-50. 
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hypothesis. 
Second, a possible simultaneity bias may also exist between the offering 
discount and the cumulative excess return proxy for the expected market 
reaction to news of a Regulation S offering.100 On one hand, foreign investors 
will demand compensation for the expected negative market reaction to the 
extent that they must sell after information disclosure, leading to a greater 
offering discount. On the other hand, a greater offering discount may lead to 
a larger negative market reaction. For example, where the offering discount 
is due to managers opportunistically using Regulation S to transfer value to 
themselves from the shareholders of the issuer, a greater offering discount 
will directly reduce the value of the issuer. Where the offering price is below 
the pre-offering fundamental value, the share value of all pre-offering 
investors is necessarily diluted. A larger offering discount under such 
circumstances, therefore, will result in a greater negative market reaction. 
The appendix uses a two-stage least-squares model to control for possible 
simultaneity bias in the estimation of the offering discount model. As 
discussed in the Appendix, the coefficient on the pre-reporting reform 
dummy variable in the two-stage least-squares model is not statistically 
significant. The results from the Appendix, therefore, also fail to provide 
evidence in support of the overvaluation resale hypothesis. 
Third, the ability of foreign investors to engage in short sales immediately 
after an offering of the issuer’s securities inside the United States during both 
the pre- and post-reporting reform periods also calls into question this 
Article’s results.101 Through a short sale, foreign investors are effectively 
able to sell the economic risk of ownership of the Regulation S securities 
even prior to the expiration of the resale -restricted period. To the extent short 
sales occur even during the post-reporting reform period, therefore, foreign 
investors may be able to sell into an overvalued market prior to disclosure of 
the offering. Short sales, therefore, may eliminate the beneficial information 
effect of the reporting reforms and thereby reduce the effectiveness of this 
Article’s tests that focus on differences between the pre and post-reporting 
reform periods. The SEC, nevertheless, started taking a hard line against 
foreign investors engaging in short sales of Regulation S securities in 
1995.102 Even with the theoretical possibility of short sales, therefore, 
 
 
 100. Simultaneity bias occurs when one of the independent variables in a regression model, in 
fact, is a function of the dependent variable. 
 101. See supra  note 8 and accompanying text. Alternatively, foreign investors both pre- and post-
reporting reform may simply ignore Regulation S’s resale prohibitions and resell illegally into the 
United States immediately after the offering. For a discussion of the possibility of illegal resales see 
Jordan, supra  note 36, at 75. 
 102. See 1995 Problematic Practices Release, supra  note 16, at *3: 
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investors should have found it more difficult to engage in overvaluation 
resales into the United States after the 1996 SEC’s reporting reforms. The 
presence of short sales, if anything, should have increased the likelihood of 
finding a greater offering discount in the post-reform time period in support 
of the overvaluation resale hypothesis. 
Finally, the offering discount model suffers from at least one additional 
flaw: the controls may not capture all the exogenous factors that may have 
shifted between the pre- and post-reporting reform periods. The amount of 
overvaluation in the pool of companies seeking to conduct a Regulation S 
offering, for example, may have shifted from the pre- to the post-reporting 
reform periods.103 Prior to the reporting reforms, companies with overvalued 
securities in the U.S. secondary market may have made use of Regulation S 
to issue securities indirectly into the United States. The 1996 reporting 
reform reduces the gain from offering securities into an overvalued market, 
leading fewer companies with overvalued securities to engage in Regulation 
S offerings. With a lower average level of overvaluation, the offering 
discount may decline in the post-reporting reform period. Foreign investors 
may demand a greater offering discount as a percentage of the overvaluation 
amount in the U.S. secondary market during the post-reporting reform period 
due to a decreased ability to engage in overvalued resales; alternatively, the 
offering discount may have dropped due to the reduced overall level of 
overvaluation among companies seeking to engage in a Regulation S 
offering. 
Consider the following numerical example. Assume the mean level of 
 
 
Since the adoption of Regulation S, it has come to the Commission’s attention that some market 
participants are conducting placements of securities purportedly offshore under Regulation S 
under circumstances that indicate that such securities are in essence being placed offshore 
temporarily to evade registration requirements with the result that the incidence of ownership of 
the securities never leaves the U.S. market, or that a substantial portion of the economic risk 
relating thereto is left in or is returned to the U.S. market during the restricted period, or that the 
transaction is such that there was no reasonable expectation that the securities could be viewed as 
actually coming to rest abroad. These transactions are the types of activities that run afoul of 
Preliminary Note 2, would not be covered by the safe harbors and would be found not to be an 
offer and sale outside the United States for purposes of the general statement under Rule 901. 
Id. See also  In re GFL Ultra Fund Ltd., Securities Act Release No. 7423, [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. 
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,949 at 89,752 (June 18, 1997) (holding that a fund that purchased securities 
through a Regulation S offering and then immediately engaged in short sales into the United States 
acted as a statutory underwriter under Section 2(11) of the Securities Act for the issuer); supra note 9 
(discussing the 1998 reforms provisions against hedging transactions). 
 103. The use of the natural log of the market capitalization as an independent variable in this 
article’s offering discount models, in part, may control for the difference in mean secondary market 
overvaluation for Regulation S issuers prior to and after the SEC’s 1996 reporting reforms. However, 
even among issuers with the same amount of market capitalization, a range of secondary market 
overvaluation may exist. 
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secondary market overvaluation among Regulation S issuers equals 40% of 
the U.S. secondary market price pre-reporting reform. Pre-reporting reform, 
assume further that foreign investors are able to resell into the U.S. market 
prior to any market reaction and negotiate a one-quarter share of the 
overvaluation amount. Pre-reporting reform, therefore, foreign investors will 
receive a 10% offering discount on average. In comparison, assume that post-
reporting reform the mean level of secondary market overvaluation among 
Regulation S issuers falls to only 5%. Foreign investors unable to resell prior 
to the market reaction will demand compensation for the entire expected 
secondary market reaction, leading to a 5% offering discount. Under this 
particular example, the observed offering discount will decrease in the post-
reporting reform period. Nevertheless, such decrease is consistent with the 
overvaluation resale hypothesis. 
To call this Article’s findings against the overvaluation resale hypothesis 
into question, however, it is not enough simply to argue that the level of 
overvaluation in the post-reporting reform pool of Regulation S issuers is 
lower than the overvaluation among the pre-reporting reform issuers. 
Suppose that the overvaluation resale hypothesis is true and pre-reporting 
reform and foreign investors acting as conduits negotiate to take a %x  share 
of the overvaluation surplus on average. To mask an increase in the offering 
discount due to a reduced ability to engage in resales of overvalued securities 
post-reporting reform, the mean level of overvaluation must then fall to %x  
of its pre-reporting reform level. Thus, in the above numerical example, 
because pre-reporting reform foreign investors negotiated a one-quarter share 
of the overvaluation surplus, the post-reporting reform mean overvaluation 
amount must be reduced to twenty-five percent of its pre-reporting reform 
level; that is, it must drop from forty dollars to ten dollars or less per share. 
Significantly, the smaller the negotiated share of the overvaluation surplus, 
the greater the drop in the mean overvaluation level among Regulation S 
issuers that is necessary post-reporting reform to mask any increase in the 
discount.104 
Importantly, the 1996 reporting reforms did not eliminate the presence of 
overvalued securities in the U.S. secondary market. Nor did the reforms 
reduce the incentive of managers with undervalued securities to forego 
making a securities offering.105 Instead, the reforms may have resulted in a 
 
 
 104. For example, if foreign investors took only a 10% share of the overvaluation surplus pre-
reform, the mean level of overvaluation among Regulation S issuers must drop from $40 down to $4 
post -reporting reform to mask the increase in the offering discount due to the reduced ability to engage 
in resales prior to information disclosure after the reporting reforms.  
 105. See supra  note 24 and accompanying text (discussing the incentive of managers to sell when 
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shift in the subset of the overall pool of U.S. companies that sought to 
conduct a Regulation S offering toward less overvalued companies. The 
exact magnitude of this shift is crucial in assessing the validity of this 
Article’s tests of the overvaluation resale hypothesis.106 
As an additional test of the level of overvaluation during the pre and post-
reporting reform periods, the Article compared the Tobin’s Q level across the 
two periods. Tobin’s Q represents a measurement of the degree to which the 
stock market valuation of a company exceeds its book value. A low Tobin’s 
Q indicates the possibility of only small amounts of overvaluation in the 
market. A high Tobin’s Q, on the other hand, may mean either that the 
security of a company is overvalued or that the company has substantial 
intangible value, due to good will for example. Table 9 presents a breakdown 
of the mean Tobin’s Q level for the pre and post-reporting reform sample of 
issuers on which offering discount data is available.  
Table 9: Comparison of Pre- and Post-1996 Reform Tobin Qs for 
Regulation S Issuers Where Offering Discount Data Exists
Type of Offering Observations 
Mean  
Tobin’s Q Median Discount 
Pre-Reporting Reform 246 3.02 2.27 
Post-Reporting Reform 163 3.45 2.22 
(t-test of difference in means p-value = 0.3161). 
Tobin’s Q is defined as (Market Value of equity + book-value of long-
term debt + book-value of short-term debt + preferred stock at carrying 
value) divided by book value of assets.  
From Table 9 note that the mean Tobin’s Q actually increases from the 
pre to post-reporting reform period. Although the increase is not statistically 
significant, it does provide evidence that the Tobin’s Q did not decrease. The 
results from Table 9, however, are not conclusive to the extent the increase in 
Tobin’s Q may be due to greater intangible value in issuers post-reporting 
reform rather than overvaluation. 
The limitations of the Article’s empirical tests raised in this section make 
it important not to overstate the finding that the Regulation S offering 
discount did not change in a statistically significant manner between the pre- 
and post-reporting reform time periods. Other exogenous factors may exist in 
 
 
the securities markets overvalue the issuer’s securities). 
 106. For example, an issuer with highly overvalued securities in the U.S. secondary market may 
choose to conduct a Regulation S offering post -reporting reform to raise capital for new capital 
expenditures.  
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addition to those covered in this section.107 Moreover, this Article’s results 
apply only to Exchange Act reporting issuers.108 Nevertheless, the empirical 
evidence should alert policy makers to the theoretical possibility that a large 
offering discount is not necessarily detrimental to the interests of U.S. 
investors. The evidence is also at least consistent with the hypothesis that 
issuers and foreign investors were unsuccessful in using Regulation S as a 
conduit to sell overvalued securities into the United States before the 1996 
reporting reforms. Even to the extent that non-Exchange Act reporting 
issuers present a greater risk to U.S. investors, this Article sheds doubt on the 
value of the SEC’s 1998 Reforms’ wholesale tightening of Regulation S for 
all types of issuers regardless of Exchange Act reporting status.109 
III. CONCLUSION 
Regulation S offerings result on average in a negative secondary market 
reaction once U.S. investors learn of the offering. The Article provides 
evidence that the likelihood that managers believe the issuer’s securities are 
overvalued as well as the issuer’s stated use of proceeds from the offering are 
weakly significant in explaining the secondary market reaction. 
Focusing on the U.S. secondary market reaction, this Article tests whether 
foreign investors expect to resell Regulation S securities into the United 
States ahead of the market reaction to news of the offering. Where foreign 
investors are able to resell prior to information disclosure of the Regulation S 
offering to the secondary market, foreign investors may act as conduits for 
issuers attempting to sell overvalued securities into the United States. To the 
extent managers seek to benefit pre-offering shareholders, they will negotiate 
to give foreign investors as small an offering discount as possible. In 
contrast, where foreign investors are unable to resell prior to the secondary 
market reaction to news of the offering, they will demand a greater discount 
in compensation for the entire expected market reaction. Without such a 
discount, Regulation S offerings result in a transfer in value from foreign 
investors to U.S. investors; rational foreign investors will choose not to 
 
 
 107. For example, the liquidity of world markets generally may have increased from the pre- to 
post -reporting reform time periods. Foreign investors, therefore, may demand a lower illiquidity 
premium for their Regulation S securities. This reduction in illiquidity discount then may have offset 
any increase in the offering discount due to a reduction in the ability of issuers and foreign investors to 
resell securities into the United States prior to market reaction to news of the Regulation S offering. 
 108. See supra  text accompanying note 48 (describing the methodology used to collect Regulation 
S offerings for the article’s data set). 
 109. See supra  text accompanying notes 9-15 (describing the SEC’s 1998 reforms to Regulation 
S). 
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participate in such offerings. 
This Article furnishes evidence consistent with the hypothesis that foreign 
investors were in fact unable to engage in resales ahead of the U.S. secondary 
market reaction to a Regulation S offering before the SEC’s 1996 reporting 
reforms. For example, the commencement of resales may have signaled 
sufficient information to U.S.-based financial analysts to trigger a secondary 
market reaction to the Regulation S offering before significant quantities of 
securities are resold into the United States. This Article therefore weakens 
the arguments of those that point to the large offering discount foreign 
investors typically receive as evidence of the danger of Regulation S to U.S. 
investors. To the extent that the offering discount compensates foreign 
investors for the expected drop in the U.S. secondary market price, foreign 
investors do not gain relative to U.S. investors. 
A full evaluation of the benefits from the SEC’s recent reforms to 
Regulation S requires additional inquiry into the other ways in which a 
Regulation S offering may harm U.S. investors aside from the resale of 
overvalued securities into the United States.110 Nevertheless, the Article’s 
findings cast doubt on the value of the SEC’s 1998 reforms that increased 
restrictions indiscriminately for all U.S. companies seeking to raise capital 
abroad through Regulation S. 
 
 
 110. See generally Choi, supra  note 17 (providing a general analysis of the benefits of the SEC’s 
1998 reforms to Regulation S). 
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Appendix 
A possible simultaneity bias may exist with the cumulative excess return 
independent variable in this Article’s offering discount ordinary least-squares 
models. The greater the expected negative market reaction, as measured 
using the cumulative excess return, the larger offering discount foreign 
investors will obtain. The reverse causality, however, is also possible. A 
larger offering discount may lead foreign investors to expect a more negative 
market response to the offering. Where insiders gain opportunistically 
through a Regulation S offering, for example, the size of the offering 
discount is directly related to the dilution the issuer’s pre-offering 
shareholders endure and therefore will determine the expected U.S. 
secondary market reaction to the offering. 
To control for the simultaneity bias, a two-stage least-squares model is 
estimated for the offering discount, taking both the offering discount and the 
cumulative excess return variables as endogenous. The equation for the 
offering discount is based on offering discount model reported in Table 8. 
The equation for the cumulative excess return is based on the model reported 
in Table 5 for the cumulative excess return with the addition of independent 
variables for the number of institutional investors that own common stock in 
the issuer and the fraction of common stock in the hands of institutional 
investors.111 Both institutional investor-related variables are assumed to 
correlate with the speed with which the market reacts to news from a 
Regulation S offering. For companies with a large number of institutional 
investors the market may react more quickly to resales of Regulation S 
securities into the United States even during the pre-reporting reform period, 
increasing the expected market reaction prior to when resales commence. 
Likewise, for companies with a small number of institutional investors, the 
market may react slowly even during the post-reporting reform period, 
decreasing the expected market reaction at the time foreign investors are able 
to engage in resales into the United States. Neither measure of institutional 
presence, however, is assumed to directly affect the offering discount given 
to foreign investors. 
Table 10 reports the results for the two-stage least-squares model of the 
offering discount using the six-week cumulative excess return in Model A. 
Model B then estimates the two-stage least square model using the eight-
week cumulative excess return. 
 
 
 111. Both the number of institutional investors and the fraction of common stock in the hands of 
institutional investors are obtained for each Regulation S issuer from the SEC Disclosure database. 
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Table 10: Two-Stage Least Squares Model of the Offering Discount 
Independent Variables 
Model A: 
Two-Stage Least 
Squares Model of 
the Offering 
Discount (using 6-
Week CER) 
Model B:  
Two-Stage Least 
Squares Model of 
the Offering 
Discount (using 8-
Week CER) 
Natural Log of Market Capitalization -0.027 -0.030 
 (-0.904) (-1.006) 
Natural Log of the Offering Amount  -0.024 -0.024 
to Market Capitalization Ratio (-0.933) (-0.934) 
Number of World Contacts -0.001 -0.002 
 (-0.242) (-0.359) 
Dummy Variable for Common Stock 0.054 0.044 
 (0.737) (0.649) 
Dummy Variable for 144A Offering -0.256* -0.247* 
 (-1.866) (-1.836) 
Fraction of the Board composed of  0.439** 0.435** 
Officers (2.122) (2.090) 
Fraction of Common Stock owned by -0.198 -0.216 
Directors and Officers (MDHOLD) (-0.389) (-0.428) 
MDHOLD^2 0.278 0.295 
 (0.361) (0.387) 
Predicted 6 Week Cumulative Excess -0.158 . 
Return From First Stage of Model (-0.563)  
Predicted 8 Week Cumulative Excess . -0.097 
Return From First Stage of Model  (-0.415) 
Dummy for Pre-Reporting Reform  0.026 0.030 
Period (0.400) (0.486) 
Dummy Variable for Europe Base Base 
   
Dummy Variable for Canada -0.023 -0.022 
 (-0.251) (-0.242) 
Dummy Variable for Asia  -0.035 -0.044 
 (-0.300) (-0.378) 
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Dummy Variable for Middle East -0.259 -0.313 
 (-0.863) (-1.181) 
Dummy Variable for Latin/South  0.114 0.104 
America (1.586) (1.484) 
Dummy Variable for Other (including -0.399 -0.357 
Africa) (-1.352) (-1.310) 
Constant -0.005 0.017 
 (-0.028) (0.097) 
Observations 81 81 
F-value 3.59** 3.63** 
Adjusted R2 0.345 0.353 
** 5% confidence level. * 10% confidence level. (t-statistic in parenthesis). 
F-value tests the joint hypothesis that all regression coefficients equal zero. 
As reported in Table 10, even after controlling from the simultaneity bias, 
the coefficients on the six-week and eight-week cumulative excess return 
variables are negative. A greater negative market reaction correlates with a 
larger offering discount. Neither coefficient, however, is statistically 
significant. 
Note also from Models A and B in Table 10 that the coefficient on the 
dummy variable for the pre-reporting reform period is both positive and 
statistically insignificant. If anything, therefore, the discount is greater during 
the pre-reporting reform period even after controlling for the simultaneity 
bias between the offering discount and the cumulative excess return. Models 
A and B, therefore, provide no support for the overvaluation resale 
hypothesis (where foreign investors are able to engage in resales ahead of 
information disclosure, one would expect a lower discount during the pre-
reporting reform period). Nevertheless, the two-stage least-squares model 
may not fully correct for the simultaneity bias to the extent the additional 
exogenous variables, including the number of institutional investors and the 
fraction of common stock held by institutional investors, correlate not only 
with the market reaction but also directly with the offering discount. 
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